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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1990, Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst published their oft-cited study of
rulemaking at the National Highway Safety Administration. 1 The Mashaw and
Harfst study added to the growing literature expressing concern about agencies'
hesitancy to set policy by legislative rulemaking. Like the authors of other
studies,2 Mashaw and Harfst laid much of the blame for the ossification of the
rulemaking process at the feet of the federal judiciary. 3 According to these
studies, increasingly burdensome judicial demands for data and explanations in
support of agency rules has led agencies either to use other procedures, such as
individual adjudications, to set policy, or to abandon policymaking in certain
domains altogether. 4 Unlike the authors of other studies, however, Mashaw and
Harfst did not advocate simply easing the standard by which courts review
agency rules. They expressed some trepidation that easing standards might
compromise requirements of the American legal culture,5 which in turn could
*Associate Professor, Florida State University College of Law. I am grateful to Rob
Atkinson, Dan Gifford, Jerry Mashaw, and Jim Rossi for their insightful comments on earlier
drafts and in discussions about this article.
I JERRY L. MASHAW & DAviD L. HARFsr, Tim SJGGIm FOR AUTO SAFrY (1990).
2 See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking
Process, 41 DuKE L.J. 1385, 1412 (1992); R. Shep Melnick, Administrative Law and
Bureaucratic Reality, 44 ADMIN. L. REy. 245, 247 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two
Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and
Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DuKE L.J. 300, 327. But cf Patricia M.
Wald, The 1993 Justice Lester W. Roth Lecture-Regulation at Risk: Are Courts Part of the
Solution or Most of the Problem?, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 621, 632-39 (1994) (suggesting that
courts are not the primary cause of rulemaking ossification).
3 "The term 'ossification' refers to the inefficiencies that plague regulatory programs
because of analytic hurdles that agencies must clear in order to adopt new rules." Mark
Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial
Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 77 Tmc. L. Ray. 483, 483 (1997).
4 See, e.g., MASHAW & HARF, supra note 1, at 225; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The
Unintended Effects of Judicial Review of Agency Rules: How Federal Courts Have
Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of the 1990s, 43 ADMIN. L. RFv. 7, 27 (1991).
5 See MAsHw & HARsr, supra note 1, at 225-28.
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undermine the public trust that the overall regulatory process will not be
allowed to run amok.6 Mashaw and Harfst suggested instead that courts refrain
from reviewing a rule until after the agency has applied the rule in a particular
context,7 either in a proceeding in which an applicant seeks a permit from the
agency or one in which the agency enforces the rule against a private entity
subject to its dictates.
In a recent article, Mashaw elaborated on his preference for delaying
judicial review, rather than easing the standard of review.8 In this article,
Mashaw sought to identify the benefits of delaying judicial review by modeling
such review of agency rules as a game. He concluded that the option to
challenge a rule prior to its enforcement would virtually always lead some
entity to institute such a challenge.9 In contrast, he concluded that without this
option regulated entities would frequently attempt to comply with the rule
because delaying review subjects these entities to the threat of penalty for
noncompliance before they know whether the rule is valid.10
According to Mashaw's game theoretic analysis, attempts at compliance
would have several salutary effects. First, such attempts may simply decrease
the likelihood that a rule will be challenged,'1 which will relieve the pressure
on agencies to devote resources to ensuring that rules will pass hard look
judicial review.12 Second, such attempts can generate information that is
6 Mashaw and Harfst's recognition that public support for regulation, while widespread,
is "very thin," MAsHAW & HARr, supra note 1, at 249-50, is consistent with my assertion
that the populace supports meaningful judicial review to limit overreaching regulation. See
also Robert Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Couns: Twenty Years of
Law and Politics, 54 LAw & ComrMP. PRoBs., Autumn 1991, at 249, 250 (contending
generally that the attitudes of reviewing courts to administrative decisions reflect prevailing
political assumptions about the roles and competence of political institutions like the
legislature, particular agencies, and the courts themselves).
7 See MAsHAw & H sr, supra note 1, at 245-47.
8 Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaing: An Essay on
Management, Games, and Accountability, 57 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs., Spring 1994, at
185, 233-38.
9 See id. at 224.
10 See id. at 225-28.
11 See id. at 228-29.
12 The literature on the impact of judicial review on the ossification of rulemaking is
replete with explanations of how close judicial scrutiny ossifies the administrative regulatory
process. See id. at 200-04 (surveying studies that support the ossifying impact of judicial
review); see also, e.g., McGarity, supra note 2, at 1412 (noting that agencies will attempt to
prepare responses to all contentions to avoid remands under hard look review); Sidney A.
Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory Alternatives and Legislative
Reform, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 9-10 (1989) (blaming OSHA's glacial pace of rulemaking on
the demanding "substantial evidence" standard in its authorizing act and on judicial
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relevant to the validity of a rule.13 For these reasons, Mashaw sees delaying
judicial review until the post-enforcement stage as the most promising approach
to deossifying the rulemaking process.
This Article extends Mashaw's game theoretic analysis and
comprehensively analyzes the effects of delaying judicial review in a variety of
circumstances. It begins by reviewing the potential for judicial review to
alleviate ossification of rulemaking. It then identifies several potential offsetting
detriments of delaying review and posits several empirical questions that have a
significant bearing on the net social value of delaying review. Using variations
on Mashaw's simple two-entity game, the Article proceeds to evaluate under
what circumstances the answers to these questions are likely to favor delaying
judicial review. Finally, the Article draws on the conclusions of the game
theoretic analysis to suggest that delaying review of rules until the agency
attempts to enforce them would be best done by Congress, and then only in a
limited set of circumstances.
I. DELAYING JUDICIAL REVIEW TO ENCOURAGE
AGENCY RULEMAKING
A. Delaying Review as a Means of Deossifying the Rulemaking Process
One of the major differences between the judicial review of agency rules
and agency policies made through adjudicatory proceedings is the parties'
ability to challenge rules before being subject to them. The Supreme Court laid
down the standards for when courts may entertain such pre-enforcement
challenges to rules in Abbott Laboratories Inc. v. Gardner.14 The Court
identified as central inquiries whether the issues raised by a challenge are fit for
judicial resolution prior to the rule being applied and whether delaying judicial
review would create a hardship for the parties. 15 Despite the Court's focus on
these seemingly case-specific factors, courts after Abbott Laboratories have
almost always permitted pre-enforcement review of final rules that mandate a
substantive standard of conduct.16
application of that standard). For a description of the hard look doctrine and the reason for its
development, see Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 SuP.
Cr. REv. 177, 181-83.
13 See Mashaw, supra note 8, at 234.
14 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
15 See id. at 149.
16 See Richard Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaldng, 47 ADMWn. L.
REv. 59, 89 (1995). Pierce believes, however, that the recent Supreme Court cases, Reno v.
Catholic Soc. Servs., 509 U.S. 43 (1993), and Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S.
19971
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Mashaw's game theoretic analysis purports to show that, because courts
grant interested persons the right to challenge a rule before it may take effect,
the probability is great that some entity will seek judicial review to have the rule
overturned. 17 A minor elaboration of the game he proposes leads to the
outcomes he predicts.
1. The Propensity of Regulated Entities to Challenge Rules
Prior to Their Enforcement
From Mashaw's explicit partial specification of the game, along with his
subsequent analysis, one can completely specify the game he proposes as
follows: There are two players, G.M. and Chrysler, each of which is subject to
a regulation adopted by the agency. Each player will have to pay compliance
costs of 5 if the rule is not invalidated on judicial review. In addition, each will
have to pay litigation costs of 1 if it challenges the rule prior to enforcement or
if the agency attempts to enforce the rule against it. The probability of a court
invalidating the rule is 0.5 whether on pre-enforcement review or in the
agency's enforcement action against a player. The payoff matrix for this game
is as follows: 18
200 (1994), signal a retreat by the Court from the permissive stance represented by Abbott
Laboratories and decisions applying the standard it announced. See KENNEMH CULP DAvis &
RIcHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISIRATIVE LAw TREATIsE § 15.14, at 185-88 (3d ed. Supp.
1995).
17 See Mashaw, supra note 8, at 226-29.
18 Mashaw asserted that the payoff for the player not suing, when the other player sues
is 3.5 rather than 2.5. See Mashaw, supra note 8, at 223. This is incorrect. Mashaw derived
the payoff of 3.5 for a player who does not sue when the other player does by noting that the
first player avoids compliance costs one half of the time and avoids litigation costs. But the
baseline of 0 assumes that the player pays no litigation cost, so to add a savings of 1 for
avoiding these costs essentially double counts them. All other figures in Mashaw's payoff
matrix are correct.
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Chrysler Sues Chrysler Does Not Sue
G.M. Sues (1.5, 1.5) (1.5, 2.5)
G.M. Does Not Sue (2.5, 1.5) (1.5, 1.5)
This game has three pure Nash equilibria: 19 {Sue, Do Not Sue},
{Do Not Sue, Sue}, and {Do Not Sue, Do Not Sue}. If the players began by
considering any one of these strategy profiles, neither could unilaterally
improve its payoff by changing its strategy.
Nonetheless, this game has a single determinate outcome because the
strategy {Do Not Sue, Do Not Sue} weakly dominates all others.20 Chrysler
will never sue because, regardless of what G.M. does, Chrysler achieves at
least as great a payoff by not suing as by suing. By symmetry, G.M. will also
never sue. Thus, one has every reason to believe that, despite the existence of
three Nash equilibria, the outcome for this game would be that no entity
challenges the rule.
Moreover, this outcome is not an artifact of the numbers. If X is the cost of
compliance, and L the cost of litigation, then the payoff matrix generalizes to
the following:
Chrysler Sues Chrysler Does Not Sue
G.M. Sues (IhX-L, /X-L) ( ,X-L, ,X)
G.M. Does Not Sue ( ,X, hX-L) ( ,X-L, ,X-L)
The same three Nash equilibria exist, and the strategy profile
{Do Not Sue, Do Not Sue} still weakly dominates the others.
19 A Nash equilibrium is a strategy for each player such that "no player has an incentive
to deviate from [its] strategy given that the other players do not deviate [from theirs]." ERic
RASMUsEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCrION TO GAME THEORY 23 (2d ed.
1994).
20 See id. at 20 (defining a weak dominant strategy equilibrium). Mashaw missed this
equilibrium and instead found the game to be indeterminate because the equation he used to
derive the mixed strategy equilibrium that he predicted did not correspond to the payoff
matrix of the game. See Mashaw, supra note 8, at 224 & n.112.
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Thus, the strategy in which neither player sues will be the outcome
regardless of the compliance cost or the litigation cost. The game as specified
by Mashaw is one for which the free rider problem of letting the other player
sue always dominates.21
It is easy, however, to change the assumptions of the game in a reasonable
way and thereby specify a game that supports the conclusion that entities will
have a strong incentive to challenge a rule. For example, assume that
noncompliance was accompanied by a penalty of 7 (in addition to compliance
costs) that is assessed if the agency successfully enforces the rule against a
player. Moreover, assume that once a rule is upheld in a pre-enforcement
challenge by one player, both players comply with the rule, but that neither
complies if the rule is struck down upon such a challenge or in an enforcement
proceeding. Of course, if the rule is upheld in an enforcement proceeding, the
entity incurs the costs of subsequent compliance as well as the penalty. This
revised game yields a payoff matrix as follows:
Chrysler Sues Chrysler Does Not Sue
G.M. Sues (1.5, 1.5) (1.5, 2.5)
G.M. Does Not Sue (2.5,1.5) (-2,-2)
This game has only two pure Nash equilibria: {Sue, Do Not Sue} and {Do
Not Sue, Sue}. Because no strategy dominates, the outcome of the game is
indeterminate.
In the real world, however, regulated entities may be faced with numerous
agency rules that they might wish to challenge. The situation corresponds to the
previous game being repeated over and over again. In such a repeat-game
scenario, one would expect each entity to sue sometimes and not others. If the
entities could enforce agreements coordinating their behavior, then only one
21 Mashaw points out, however, that the free rider problem for entities in an industry
might be "solved" by creating an industry association to bring rule challenges. In addition, he
notes that there is social pressure for each entity to contribute its "fair share of expenses
necessary to promote the [group's] 'common good."' See Mashaw, supra note 8, at 223; see
also MANCuR OLSON, JR., THm LoGIc oF CoLLEcrvE AcrioN: PuBic GooDs AND ThE
THEORY OF GROuPs 137-43 (1965) (noting the ability of particular industries to form
lobbying organizations). The costs of negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing private
agreements to overcome free rider problems, however, can prevent such agreements from
working effectively. See id. at 47 (noting that the costs of organizing and maintaining an
interest group creates a barrier to effective coordination of group members' conduct).
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entity would sue for each rule,22 and each entity who benefits from rule
challenges would have an incentive to agree to bear some of the burden of
litigation. Absent the ability to enforce cooperation, each entity's choice of
whether to sue in a particular case will be random, but each will sue a certain
percentage of the time. The proportion of rules that each will challenge
corresponds to the mixed-strategy equilibrium for the repeated game; this
proportion satisfies the following equation:23
1.5C + 1.5 (1-C) - 2.5C + 2(1-C) = 0.
This is satisfied if C = 0.78, the same percentage as Mashaw predicted for
his original game.2
This revised game also indicates that the propensity to sue despite the free
rider problem is not as greatly dependent upon the magnitude of the penalty as
one might suspect. For any penalty P, one finds a changed payoff only for the
strategy in which neither party sues, and the payoff for that strategy is (1.5-1 P,
1.5- hP). One can plug this payoff into the mixed-strategy equilibrium
22 Suit by a single entity would occur because it is the wealth maximizing outcome. See
RASMUSEN, supra note 19, at 18 (noting that the ability to enforce cooperative agreements
converts the situation into a cooperative game, and that cooperative game theory often
predicts wealth maximizing outcomes with side payments to induce every player to go along);
cf. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960) (noting that, in the
absence of transaction costs, economic actors will trade legal entitlements until they reach a
wealth maximizing outcome). The ability of regulated entities, however, to free ride on other
entities' suits and to engage in strategic behavior about the value they place on a rule
challenge, can interfere with their ability to coordinate rule challenges effectively. See Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: Two
Views of the Cathedral, 85 Hv. L. REv. 1089, 1095 & n. 13 (1972) (noting that the ability
of property users to hide the value they place on getting rid of a nuisance will dissuade the
bringing of nuisance suits that affect a large number of individuals); see also OLsON, supra
note 21, at 48 (explaining why the difficulties a group faces in coordinating its members'
behavior increase with group size).
23 See generally RAsMusEN, supra note 19, at 67-71 (defining and discussing mixed
strategies). To solve for a mixed-strategy equilibrium, one must maximize each entity's
payoff with respect to the probability of that entity playing a particular strategy. See id. at 69.
The first-order condition for a maximum is that the derivative of each entity's payoff, as a
function of the proportion of time that the entity plays a particular strategy, be zero. For the
revised game, if C represents the percentage of time that Chrysler sues, and G the percentage
of time that G.M. sues, then G.M.'s payoff is as follows:
G[1.5C + 1.5(1-C)] + [1-G][2.5C - 2(1-C)].
Differentiating with respect to G and setting the result equal to 0 yields the equation in
the text.24 See Mashaw, supra note 8, at 224 & n.112.
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equation,25 and solve for the probability of suit by Chrysler that can support a
mixed equilibrium. This probability is as follows:
C = 1/2P + [1+ hP].
By symmetry, an equilibrium exists only if this is the probability of suit by
G.M. as well. Thus, there is some probability of suit for even the smallest of
penalties. Moreover, a penalty as small as 1 (equal to the litigation cost and
only one-fifth of the compliance cost) results in each player suing one-third of
the time. This translates into at least one of the two entities suing 56% of the
time.26 In reality, there are likely to be many more than two regulated entities
subject to a rule, and many issues in a rulemaking on which a challenge may
succeed. Hence, the propensity for someone to challenge the rule will be even
greater.
This propensity for some regulated entity to challenge a rule occurs because
pre-enforcement review allows an entity to ignore the penalty until after a court
has determined the validity of the rule. Only the cost of litigation, compared to
the cost of compliance, dissuades an entity from suing. In the usual case,
however, the expected savings in compliance costs, created by the possibility
that a court will reverse the rule and relieve the entity of the rule's regulatory
burdens, significantly outweigh the costs of litigation.27 As the game I have
25 The maximization condition for the mixed equilibrium becomes as follows:
1.5C + 1.5(1-C) - 2.5C - (1.5- P)(1-C) = 0.26 The probability of a challenge is one minus the probability that neither group
challenges the rule. The probability of no challenge is the product of the probabilities that
neither group challenges the rule, or (0.67)2 = 0.44.
2 7 If q denotes the probability that the court will affirm the rule and X the expected costs
of compliance, then the expected cost savings equal (1-q)X. Frequently, q is on the order of
0.5, see Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of
Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1022 (finding that over the long run
43.9% of rulemalings were affirmed in toto), and X may be in the tens of millions of dollars.
Rarely do litigation costs for a rule challenge reach into the millions of dollars.
The incentive to challenge a rule occurs even if suits are not successful in an appreciable
percentage of cases (i.e., even if q is approximately equal to 1) as long as the regulated entity
enjoys sufficient cost savings merely from delaying application of the rule. Thus, pre-
enforcement review encourages regulated entities "'to file petitions for review, based on
frivolous or other unmeritorious claims, largely for the purpose or effect of delay."' SENATE
COMM. ON GOvERNMENTAL AFFAIRs, 95TH CONG., STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION IV:
DELAY IN THE REGULATORY PRocEss 14 (Comm. Print 1977) (quoting testimony of Frc
Chairman Calvin Collier before the Consumer Protection and Finance Subcommittee of the
House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee given March 8, 1977) (Hearings on
H.R. 3816); see also Howard A. Latin, Proceedings and Papers of the Conference on
Environmental Law: Air Pollution Control in the 1990s-Leaning from Past Mistakes:
Comments on Professor Weinberg's Paper, 1990 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 125, 127 (1993); Neil
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proposed illustrates, the propensity for some entity to challenge a rule is great
despite the possibility for regulated entities to free ride on the litigation of their
fellow regulatees. 28
2. The Propensity of Beneficiaries of Regulation to Challenge Rules
Prior to Their Enforcement
From the analysis above, one might surmise that beneficiaries of
regulation, or more realistically the public interest groups that represent
beneficiaries' interests, usually will not institute pre-enforcement rule challenges
because they do not face any penalty for violating the rule. This prediction,
however, is belied by the numerous rule challenges mounted by public interest
groups.29 The model fails to predict the behavior of public interest groups
because generally beneficiaries will complain that a rule is too weak.30
Beneficiaries do not seek a return to the pre-rule status quo, but rather a judicial
order forcing the agency to make the rule tougher. Unlike regulated entities,
beneficiaries of a rule cannot simply refuse to comply with the rule and be
assured of an opportunity to raise their challenge in a post-enforcement
proceeding.
The decision of a public interest group to challenge the rule can be modeled
using the following game. The baseline of zero corresponds to the benefit
bestowed by the rule the agency adopts. B denotes the additional benefit the
interest group will receive if it prevails in a rule challenge. As before, assume
that a challenger bears a litigation cost, L, and assume that the probability of
success in a rule challenge is 0.5.31 The payoff matrix for this game is as
follows:
R. Eisner, Agency Delay in Informal Rulemaking, 3 ADmN. L.J. 7, 8 (1989) (noting that
private parties can benefit from the delay that results from a rule challenge).
2 8 This seems to comport with reality. See Latin, supra note 27, at 126 (asserting that
"[u]nder the Clean Water Act.... every regulatory standard was challenged by the affected
industries").
2 9 See id. (noting that most regulations under the Clean Water Act were challenged by
environmentalists as well as affected industries).30 See Mashaw, supra note 8, at 225.
31 This game also models the behavior of regulated entities when they are precluded
from challenging a rule upon its application, well after the rule is adopted. See Frederick
Davis, Judicial Review of Rulemaking: New Patterns and New Problems, 1981 DUKE L.J.
279, 282-89, 300-08 (reporting Congress's increasing use of limitations on post-enforcement
review, listing statutes that purport to cut off post-enforcement review, but noting courts'
hesitancy to cut off such review in certain circumstances). In that situation, regulated entities
can save the costs of compliance, X, but only if they challenge the rule up-front and the court
1997]
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Interest Group B Interest Group B
Sues Does Not Sue
Interest Group A Sues ( hB-L, ,B-L) ( ,B-L, 1AB)
Interest Group A ( hB, B-L) (0, 0)
Does Not Sue I _I
As long as the costs of litigation are less than the expected benefit an
interest group derives from suing, in this case less than twice the benefit the
group will derive if it prevails in its challenge, this game has two pure Nash
equilibria: {Sue, Do Not Sue} and {Do Not Sue, Sue}. Because no strategy
dominates, the outcome of the game is indeterminate.
Like regulated entities, however, interest groups may be faced with
numerous agency rules that they might wish to challenge. The situation again
corresponds to the game being repeated over and over. As for the modified
game for regulated entities, one would expect a mixed-equilibrium outcome in
which each interest group challenges rules randomly, but a given percentage of
the time. The mixed equilibrium for this repeated game occurs with a
probability of [1-2L/B] that each interest group sues.32
According to this game theoretic analysis, therefore, there will be a
probability of suit by some entity as long as L is less than ,B. If the benefit of
prevailing on a rule challenge is only five times the litigation costs, then each
entity will sue 60% of the time. Even if there were only two potential public
interest groups to challenge each rule, at least one group would challenge the
rule 84% of the time. Thus, the propensity for beneficiaries of a rule to
challenge it upon its adoption, like the propensity of regulated entities, is also
great.
reverses the rule. Thus, the game facing regulated entities in this situation is identical to that
facing beneficiaries if one substitutes X for B.
32 If a and P represent the percentage of rules that interest groups A and B challenge
respectively, then the equation for an interest group to maximize its expected payoff is as
follows:
P( ,B-L) + (1-P)( hB-L) = f3(hB).
Solving for P gives the expression in the text. By symmetry, a must be given by the
same expression in the mixed-strategy equilibrium.
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3. Agencies' Reactions to the Likelihood of Pre-enforcement Rule
Challenges
Faced with a prospect of almost certain judicial review, an agency will not
adopt a rule unless it has collected data showing that every aspect of the rule is
justified.33 Federal courts today review rulemaking by asking whether the
agency seriously took account of all factors relevant to its decision.34 In
addition, courts demand that agencies develop data to support factual predicates
and predictions undergirding the rule.35 Hence an agency, expecting some
entity to challenge a rule, will withhold promulgating the rule until its
regulatory experts perform analyses that justify the rule in the face of every
challenge that the agency can foresee. 36 The alternative would be for the
agency to adopt a rule that stands a good chance of being overturned on judicial
review several years down the line. The time lost to the review process may
render the rule insupportable or even outdated by the time the agency might
have to consider it on remand. 37 In addition, having to reconvene the staff
involved in formulating the original rule several years after promulgation can
33 See Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 498-99.
34 See, e.g., Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 69 F.3d
752, 758-59 (6th Cir. 1995); Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 1994);
Maryland People's Counsel v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 761 F.2d 780, 785-86
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
35 See, e.g., Foundation for North Am. Wild Sheep v. United States Dep't of Agric.,
681 F.2d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 1982) (rejecting the agency's conclusions about the reaction of
wild sheep to a road because the agency presented no data on reaction of sheep to roads built
above, rather than below, the sheep's habitat); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647
F.2d 1189, 1293-98 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (rejecting OSHA findings of technological feasibility
because the agency failed to develop data quantifying the extent to which technological
innovations would reduce workers' exposure to lead).
36 See MASHAW & HARFr, supra note 1, at 121-22 (reporting a colloquy between
Senator Hartke and NHTSA's chief counsel, during which the chief counsel indicated that
judicial review was preventing NHTSA from promulgating certain regulations); McGarity,
supra note 2, at 1414-19 (reporting that overly aggressive judicial review contributed to the
abandonment of rulemaking by the EPA and Consumer Products Safety Commission); JoHN
M. MENDELOFF, THE DIEMMA OF ToXIc SUBSTANCE REGULATION 121-22 (1988) (arguing
that because of the demands of judicial review, OSHA adopts fewer rules and spends more
resources ensuring that support for those rules will pass judicial muster).
37 See Pierce, supra note 4, at 25 (noting that by the time the court reversed a FERC
rule on natural gas allocation priorities during a gas shortage, there was no longer any
shortage); Schuck & Elliott, supra note 27, at 1051 (stating that "the period of time elapsing
between the original agency decision and the agency's post-remand response is often so
protracted that new developments [relevant to the propriety of the agency decision]... are
almost bound to occur").
1997]
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greatly disrupt the agency's continued regulatory efforts. 38 Hence, because pre-
enforcement review almost guarantees that a rule will be subject to exacting
judicial review, agencies have an incentive to spend an inordinate quantity of
resources justifying regulations they have already decided to adopt. 39
Faced with this scenario, agencies will look for other means to regulate. To
avoid such pre-enforcement challenges, agencies can set policy as part of
adjudicatory proceedings or in policy statements. 4o An agency may even simply
decline to regulate altogether when the rulemaking option does not look
promising. 41 The preceding analysis suggests that courts might eliminate some
barriers that judicial review places on policymaking by rule by limiting review
of rules to the post-enforcement stage. Under this approach, entities subject to a
rule would not be able to challenge it until the agency brought suit against the
entity for failure to comply with the rule. Those who failed to comply would
face the threat of a penalty for violating the rule if the court upheld the rule in
the enforcement proceeding. Mashaw's Pre-enforcement Review Game 2
38 See Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of
Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 295 (1987); see also Richard J. Pierce &
Sidney A. Shapiro, Political and Judicial Review of Agency Action, 59 TEX. L. REv. 1175,
1193 (1981) (asserting that the "costs of active judicial review include the costs of the
rethinking and rewriting required to comply with the court's mandate [on remand]"). But c.
Schuck & Elliott, supra note 27, at 1053 (suggesting that changes in agency staff addressing
decisions on remand was not a major reason for agencies altering their decisions after
remand).
39 See E. Donald Elliott, Re-inventing Rulemaking, 41 Duke L.J. 1490, 1492-93 (1992)
(asserting that the primary purpose of notice and comment procedures are to create a record
for judicial review); Melnick, supra note 2, at 247 (contending that agencies accumulate
information and respond to all comments to defend against the uncertainty of judicial review);
Pierce & Shapiro, supra note 38, at 1193 (noting that "active judicial review... [might
prompt] a cautious administrator... to 'play it safe' by adding elaborate, costly
procedures").
40 Policy statements technically are rules under the Administrative Procedure Act, see 5
U.S.C. § 551 (1994), but do not have binding legal effect. See Robert A. Anthony, "Well,
You Want the Pennit Don't You?" Agency Efforts to Make Nonlegislative Documents Bind the
Public, 44 ADMN. L. REv. 31, 31 (1992). Under the Abbott Laboratories test for pre-
enforcement review, however, courts have frequently found policy statements to be unripe for
review until they are applied in an adjudicatory context. See Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative
Rulemaking and Regulatory Refonn, 1985 DuKE L.J. 381, 390 n.44, 422 & n.213;
Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 488 & n.34.
41 See McGarity, supra note 2, at 1393; see also MASHAW & HARFSr, supra note 1, at
10-11 (summarizing NHTSA's avoidance of rulemaking and the resulting abdication of
automobile safety regulation); Pierce, supra note 4, at 27 (predicting that FERC will back
down from proposing rules to deregulate the electricity industry because of the difficulty of
meeting judicial standards).
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demonstrates that this penalty would provide some incentive to regulated
entities to comply with a rule rather than to challenge it.42 But Mashaw's game
also counsels that the likelihood of challenges to a rule will depend heavily on
particular circumstances that affect the payoff to regulated entities from suing
versus complying. The extent to which entities will comply will depend on
numerous factors, including the costs of compliance, the probability that the
agency will actually try to enforce the rule, the probability that a reviewing
court will uphold the rule in an enforcement proceeding, the significance of the
penalty for violating the rule relative to the costs of compliance, and at the
margin the costs of litigation. Mashaw emphasizes that post-enforcement review
is unlikely to eliminate challenges altogether; instead, it will entirely discourage
challenges only in some cases and merely delay them in others. 43 Moreover,
post-enforcement review does not change the rigor with which courts review
agency policymaking. Thus, post-enforcement review maintains the role of the
courts in constraining agency action-a role that the American political system
seems to demand. 44
B. Potential Detriments of Delaying Judicial Review
Mashaw's analysis of post-enforcement review is insightful, but as Mashaw
himself suggests, evaluation of delaying review of rules warrants further study.
His analysis demonstrates that post-enforcement review holds some potential to
encourage regulated entities to comply with rules and thereby ameliorate
incentives that judicial review might otherwise give agencies to avoid
rulemaking. 45 In any particular context, however, delaying judicial review may
not be desirable.46 From the standpoint of social welfare, Mashaw's game
theoretic analysis is incomplete. It fails to address when compliance with a rule
42 See Mashaw, supra note 8, at 228.
43 See id.
44 See Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 38, at 316 (the political process seems to back a
"judicial presence in regulatory affairs"); cf Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and
the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLuM. L. REv. 452, 486-87, 497
(1989) (articulating, in the context of statutory interpretation, how the modem flexible view of
Congress's power to delegate lawmaldng power necessitates judicial control of administrative
discretion).
45 See Mashaw, supra note 8, at 228.
46 Mashaw recognizes this, noting for instance that the "complex state-federal process"
for implementing the EPA's air quality standards may require certainty about the validity of
those standards in order "to mobilize political resources." Mashaw, supra note 8, at 236. He
does not, however, attempt to categorize the situations in which delay of judicial review is
likely to provide benefits that exceed its potential costs.
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might be detrimental rather than beneficial.47 It also fails to incorporate other
indirect effects that delaying judicial review might have on the overall
rulemaldng process.48 If an agency adopts a rule that it cannot justify both
legally and as a matter of policy, the regulatory system should avoid forcing
compliance. 49 To the extent that judicial review filters out such bad rules from
good ones, pre-enforcement review benefits society.
Compliance reduces the likelihood of a challenge to a rule, and the
possibility of facing a rule challenge prompts the agency to take greater care
when promulgating the rule. Thus, by encouraging compliance, post-
enforcement review might actually discourage the care with which agencies
assess the legality and wisdom of proposed rules. 50 Post-enforcement review
might also force entities to invest in compliance with rules that later prove to be
unsound, needlessly increasing regulatory costs. 51 Entities might even decide to
47 See Cento G. Veljanovski, The Economics of Regulatory Enforcement, in ENFORCING
REGUiATION 171, 173 (Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas, eds., 1984) (noting that
efficiency concerns counsel against forcing compliance with regulations when the costs of
avoiding violation of the rule exceed the harm the violation imposes).
48 For example, the same deliberative processes within agencies that contribute to the
ossification of rulemaking also help to deter promulgation of rules that reflect accommodation
of focused interest groups or acquiescence in idiosyncratic preferences of the lead office in the
rulemaking process. See Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 510; see also William F. Pedersen, Jr.,
Formal Records and Informd Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 60 (1975) (arguing that judicial
review provides incentives within agency staff that improve the rulemaking process).
49 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522, 522-24 (noting the courts' role in assuring legality of
agency decisions and improving their impact on efficient allocation of resources); cf Mark
Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaldng in Reviewing
Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEx. L. REv. 83, 129 (1994) (deliberative democratic
theory mandates that an agency explain how its decision comports with statutory concerns and
furthers public policy).
50 One way in which judicial review increases the care with which agencies treat
rulemaking is by empowering a variety of professional groups within the agency to challenge
the view of the office pushing for the regulation. See Pedersen, supra note 48, at 60 (judicial
inquiries into the detailed justifications for regulations "give those who care about well
documented and well-reasoned decisionmaking a lever with which to move those who do
not"); James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLrrICS OF REGULATION 357,
381 (James Q. Wilson, ed., 1980) ("[a]s outside groups... hired economists and scientists to
challenge EPA decisions [in court], the power of scientists and economists within the EPA
grew").
51 For example, an EPA rule requiring equipment to filter benzene from smokestacks
resulted in an Amoco Oil Company refinery spending $31 million only to discover that the
benzene from the plant was coming from pumping gasoline into barges at its loading docks.
The EPA essentially imposed an enormous cost despite a later discovery that it provided little
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abandon a market altogether if both the costs of compliance and the penalties
for noncompliance threaten catastrophic outcomes. Even when increased
compliance is desirable, delay of judicial review increases the costs of
uncertainty that regulated entities face between the time a rule is adopted and
the time a court speaks to the rule's validity.5 2
Ultimately, the efficacy of post-enforcement review of rules as a means of
alleviating systematic bias against policymaking through rulemaldng hinges on
the answers to several empirical questions. First, does post-enforcement review
encourage compliance with those rules that are justified as matters of law and
policy, as opposed to rules that are of suspect wisdom and legality? Second,
does post-enforcement review improve the courts' ability to distinguish good
rules from bad ones? Finally, does post-enforcement review encourage agencies
to act more efficiently in adopting rules without sacrificing the likelihood that
rules will be upheld on judicial review? Although I do not answer these
questions definitively, my analysis suggests answers that only guardedly support
Mashaw's optimism about post-enforcement review and that caution, at the
very least, that changing the timing of review of rules in many regulatory
contexts may have detrimental effects on regulatory policy. 53
to no benefit. See Paiup K. HOWARD, TH DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How LAw IS
SUFFOCATING AMmCA 7 (1994).52 Although delaying judicial review can exacerbate the costs of this uncertainty, such
costs occur even with the availability of pre-enforcement review whenever a rule goes into
effect before a reviewing court decides on its validity. Perhaps the most renown case
illustrating the effect of such uncertainty is Shell Oil Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency,
950 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Ten years after the EPA adopted a rule declaring mixtures of
listed hazardous wastes to themselves be hazardous waste, the D.C. Circuit reversed and
remanded the rule, finding that the EPA had violated the Administrative Procedure Act's
notice requirements. See id. at 761. The Eighth Circuit subsequently determined that Shell Oil
overruled EPA enforcement decisions based on violations of the mixture rule prior to the
EPA's re-adoption of the rule. See United States v. Goodner Bros. Aircraft, Inc., 966 F.2d
380, 385 (8th Cir. 1992). These two decisions leave regulated entities with the dilemma of
determining whether to comply with other rules that they believe the EPA promulgated using
improper procedures. See Robert L. Glicksman, Pollution on the Federal Lands i:
Regulation of Solid and Hazardous Waste Management, 13 STAN. ENVnL. L.J. 3, 41-42
(1994) (noting the uncertainty surrounding compliance with such rules, but predicting that
regulated entities will not risk penalties for rule violations should the rules later be upheld).
53 To be fair to Mashaw, he too cautioned about the generality of his conclusion that
restricting judicial review of rules to the post-enforcement period "has much to recommend
it." Mashaw, supra note 8, at 236.
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III. EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF DELAYING JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. The Effect of Delaying Judicial Review on the Net Benefits of
Compliance
The preclusion of a pre-enforcement challenge subjects a regulated entity to
the threat of being penalized for noncompliance. Overall, such a threat will
encourage compliance with any rule. To the extent the rule is justifiable as a
matter of law and policy, encouraging compliance promotes regulatory
efficacy. But delaying judicial review might also encourage compliance with
rules that are not valid. The greater the threatened penalty for violating a rule,
the more likely it is that a regulated entity will comply with it.5 4 Rarely,
however, do regulatory schemes relate the magnitude of the penalty for
violating a rule to the degree that a rule appears justified. One might envision a
court limiting a fine for violation because the rule, although valid, was suspect
prior to judicial review. In other words, courts conceivably could set fines for
rule violations according to how close to meritorious they thought the
challenges to be.55 This, however, would involve courts in fine-tuning judicial
review to determine not only whether a rule was valid, but by how much.
Given the trouble courts have with determining mere validity, asking them to
engage in a much more difficult sliding scale evaluation of a rule seems beyond
ordinary judicial competence.5 6 Thus, once a penalty for a violation is
54 See infra text accompanying note 61.
551 am not aware of any court or commentator who has suggested such a sliding scale
approach to penalties for rule violations. The approach, however, resonates with the call by at
least one environmental law scholar for courts not to allow Congress or the EPA to
incarcerate those whose conduct ultimately is found technically to violate a criminal
regulatory provision that, prior to judicial determination, was indeterminate in scope. See
Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of Environmental
Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEo. L.J. 2407, 2526 (1995); see also
Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 285 (1978) (reversing a criminal
conviction for a violation of an EPA regulation covering asbestos release because the
regulation appeared to be a "work practice rule" rather than an "emission standard," which
rendered the rule's validity uncertain at the time of the violation).
56 Interestingly, the D.C. Circuit seems to have engaged in the flip side inquiry. The
court now asks whether a rule, though arbitrary and capricious because the agency failed
sufficiently to engage in reasoned decisionmaking, was nonetheless close enough to being
valid that the court feels justified in not vacating the rule even though it remands the rule to
the agency. One factor in determining not to vacate the rule is whether "there is at least a
serious possibility that the... [agency] will be able to substantiate its decision on remand."
Allied Signal, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 988 F.2d 146, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
Such a determination, although recognizing a level of validity for a rule somewhere between
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specified, the threatened penalty will not deter challenges to valid rules any
more than challenges to invalid rules.
The expected magnitude of any penalty, however, will vary with the
probability that the court will uphold the rule in the enforcement proceeding.
An economically rational regulated entity will discount any threatened penalty
by the entity's subjective assessment of this probability. 57 Such an assessment
may vary in proportion to the regulated entity's beliefs about the legality and
wisdom of the rule. Presumably, an entity is likely to attach a higher subjective
probability of affirmance to a rule the entity believes to be valid than it would to
a rule the entity believes to be invalid. Thus, one might suspect that delaying
judicial review is most likely to deter challenges to rules based on arguments
that the challenger itself finds suspect. By the same reasoning, one might expect
delaying judicial review to encourage compliance most when regulated entities
consider the rule reasonable, for instance when they believe that the costs of
compliance are not likely to be prohibitive.
I evaluate this hypothesis using a simple two-player game similar to the one
that Mashaw used to analyze regulated entities' propensities to comply with a
rule. Consider again two regulated entities, General Motors and Chrysler, who
now cannot challenge a regulation prior to enforcement. Their only choice is to
comply or not. If one entity complies, it will bear the costs of compliance, X. If
the entity refuses to comply, it will face an enforcement action by the regulating
agency and hence will bear litigation costs, L. In addition, if the agency is
upheld on review after it seeks to enforce the rule, the entity will have to pay
compliance costs plus some penalty, P, for violating the rule. Denoting by q
regulated entities' subjective evaluation of the probability that a court will
affirm a rule in an enforcement action by the agency, 58 the payoff matrix for
entirely valid and entirely invalid, is still easier than the sliding scale determination that a
court would have to make to set a fine for a violation in proportion to how valid it found the
rule to be. Nonetheless, some have questioned the notion that courts can in good faith find a
rule invalid and yet decide that it is likely to be substantiated on remand. See Pierce, supra
note 4, at 76 (1995); see also Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 491-92 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per
curiam) (Randolf, J., separate opinion) (questioning whether a reviewing court has legal
authority to remand a rule it does not vacate).
57 If the entity is risk averse, it will discount the penalty by a factor of less than this
probability to reflect its distaste for the uncertainty of judicial review. See MARK SEIDEFD,
MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW & ECONOMICS 72-73 (1996).
58 The dynamics of this game, as well as games I introduce later in my analysis, actually
involve three players: G.M., Chrysler, and the reviewing court. The analysis, however,
becomes intractable if I introduce the court as an independent player attempting to maximize
its own payoff. Instead, I treat the court's decision as one of "nature"-an external factor that
affects the players' assessment of the probability that the rule will be affirmed in an
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the game is as follows: 59
Chrysler Complies Chrysler Violates
G.M. complies (-X, -X) (-X, -q[X+P]-L)
G.M. violates (-q[X+P]-L, -X) (-q[X+P]-L, -q[X+P]-L)
Viewing the costs of litigation and compliance as externally dictated, this
game has a unique Nash equilibrium that depends on the values of q and P.60 If
X > [q/(1-q)]P + [1/(1-q)]L, then the Nash equilibrium is for every entity to
violate the rule. If, however, X < [q/(1-q)]P + [1/(1-q)]L, then the Nash
equilibrium is for every entity to comply with the rule. 61
enforcement action. See RAsMusEN, supra note 19, at 10 (defining "nature" as a "pseudo-
player who takes random actions at specified points in the game with specified probabilities").
My analysis considers the influence of the regulated entities' actions on the decision of the
court by postulating how the probability of affirmance will vary with the entities' actions and
assessing the likely outcomes of the game in fight of this postulated judicial behavior.
In addition, the game assumes that each entity reaches the same estimate of the
probability that the court will affirm the rule in an enforcement action. Because the game
posits no distinguishing characteristics for any entity, this assumption is reasonable as long as
no entity has information about the rule unavailable to other regulated entities.
59 The game assumes that the regulatory agency will bring an enforcement action for
every rule violation. As long as the agency enforces its rules consistently (i.e., without
varying the likelihood of enforcement as a function of X, P, L, or q), this assumption merely
simplifies the arithmetic expressions without changing the fundamental conclusions of the
analysis. This is so because relaxing the assumption by having the agency enforce any rule
with probability a merely results in the same arithmetic expression as the original game with
an effective probability q'=aq and effective litigation cost L'=aL. The predicate that
agencies will enforce rules consistently, however, is controversial. See, e.g., Keith Hawkins
and John M. Thomas, The Enforcement Process in Regudatory Bureaucracies, in ENFORCING
REGULATIONS 3, 7-15 (Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas eds., 1984) (describing agency
enforcement decisions as reflecting social norms about rule violations, the harm imposed by
the violation, and the availability of agency enforcement resources).
60 If X > q[X+P] +L, then it is easy to verify that if every entity starts by violating the
rule, no one entity can improve its payoff by complying. If X < q[X+P] +L, then if every
entity starts by complying, no one entity can improve its payoff by violating the rule. Simple
algebra converts these inequalities into those given in the text.
61 These equilibria are dominant-strategy, as well as Nash, equilibria: If X<P then each
entity does better by complying regardless of the strategy of the other entity; if X>P then
each entity does better by violating regardless of the strategy of the other entity. See
RAsMUSEN, supra note 19, at 17 (defining "dominant strategy equilibrium"). Because the
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This conclusion supports the intuitive analysis that precedes the
specification of the game. If an entity believes a rule to be valid and thus
concludes that the reviewing court will uphold the rule, then effectively q=1
and every entity will comply with the rule.62 If instead an entity believes a rule
to be invalid and thus concludes that the reviewing court will reverse the rule,
then effectively q=O and entities will violate the rule as long as the cost of
litigation does not exceed the cost of compliance. In many instances, however,
a regulated entity will remain uncertain whether a reviewing court will uphold a
rule. 63 This leads to a subjective probability of affirmance that is neither close
to zero nor one. In such an instance, an entity will comply with the rule if the
penalty is significantly greater than the cost of compliance, but will violate the
rule if the penalty is significantly less than the cost of compliance. 64
This last conclusion is partially encouraging and partially problematic. If
penalties are set approximately equal to the costs of compliance, then, to the
extent that regulated entities' subjective probabilities of affirmance depend on
the validity of the rule, denying pre-enforcement review will encourage
equilibria reflect dominant strategies, they are robust; they are not sensitive to changes in
information available to the players of the game. See id.62 Unfortunately, lawyers tend to overestimate their chances of success in litigation. See
Elizabeth F. Loftus & Willem A. Wagenaar, Lawyers' Predictions of Success, 28
JupdmEmcs J. 437, 450 (1988). For this reason, the entity's belief that a rule is valid might
not lead it to conclude that a court is likely to uphold the rule. Undue optimism on the part of
lawyers will tend to reduce any effect that barring pre-enforcement review might have on the
propensity of entities to comply with rules they consider to be valid.
63 This assertion is supported by conclusions of various case studies that judges are
incapable of distinguishing good rules from bad ones. See, e.g., MAsAw & HARr, supra
note 1, at 87-91 (relating how the reviewing court's lack of understanding of crash test
dummies led it to remand a rule that would have provided significant net social benefit); Barry
Boyer, The Federal Trade Commission and Consumer Protection Policy: A Postmortem
Evamination, in MAKING REGULATORY PoucY 93, 102 (Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas
eds., 1989) (noting that judicial review of trade regulation "seemed to reward poor empirical
analysis"); Pierce, supra note 4, at 15-18 (concluding that judicial remands of FERC's
regulations allowing equal access to gas pipelines publicly labeled FERC staff "lawless and
incompetent" for changing energy policy in a manner that was "desperately needed, urged on
an agency by the courts, welcomed by Congress, and implemented in a manner that yields
enormous improvements in the performance of a regulated market"). Of course, these studies
investigated judicial review of rules prior to enforcement, and the unpredictability of judicial
review may itself be a product of the availability of pre-enforcement review. For an analysis
of how limiting review to the enforcement stage affects the quality of judicial review, see
infra Part ll.B.
64 The condition that q be significantly different from 0 and 1 ensures that the factor
q/(1-q) is significantly greater than 0 and not significantly greater than 1. It simultaneously
ensures that the factor 1/(1-q) is not significantly greater than 1.
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compliance when compliance is appropriate. If affirmance or reversal of a rule
is highly uncertain and penalties as well litigation costs are much lower than the
costs of compliance, which unfortunately is often the case, then delaying review
to the post-enforcement stage will do little to encourage compliance, even when
entities consider the rule valid. What may be more disconcerting, if penalties
happen to be significantly greater than costs of compliance, delaying judicial
review will strongly encourage compliance even with rules that every entity
considers invalid.
Despite these disheartening predictions, the analysis suggests that for a
subset of rules pre-enforcement review can induce efficient compliance without
inducing compliance with invalid rules if the penalty for violation is set
appropriately. Often the validity of a rule will depend on whether the costs of
compliance end up being exorbitant. That may be the case when Congress
specifies that the promulgating agency is to impose regulations that are
reasonable,65 or even when the agency's authorizing statute specifies that rules
must simply be feasible. 66 Even where a statute does not so specify, the cost of
compliance with a rule frequently is an important consideration in a court's
consideration of whether to allow an agency to enforce the rule.67 If the penalty
65 Emulating the notion in tort law that a reasonableness requirement imposes a cost-
benefit standard, see United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)
(expressing the duty of reasonable care as a balance of expected costs and benefits), courts
and agencies have interpreted some statutes that call for regulation to be reasonable as
embodying a rough cost-benefit standard. For example, the Clean Air Act provision that
existing sources in dirty air areas meet emission limitations based on reasonable achievable
control technology, has been read to require the EPA and states implementing this provision
to balance the costs and benefits of compliance with the limitations. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 51.100(o) (1996) (defining "reasonably available control technology" (RACT) to require
consideration of the social and economic impact of such emission limitations); 1 WJLUAM H.
RODGERs, JR., ENvIRONMENTAL LAw: At AND WATER § 3.12(4), at 285 (RACT is
"utilitarian rather than absolutist"). In another example, courts have hinted that the
requirement of section 3(8) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act)-that
workplace safety standards be "reasonably necessary or appropriate"-might require OSHA
to find a reasonable relationship between the compliance costs and benefits of such a standard.
See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 512 (1981); United Auto
Workers v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 665, 669-70 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
66 See American Textile Mfrs., 452 U.S. at 513 n.31 (interpreting OSH Act feasibility
requirement for standards governing toxic substances in the work place as including economic
feasibility).
67 See, e.g., R. SEEP MElNICK, REGUrATION AND THE CourTs: THE CASE OF THE
CLEA MA Acr 212-20 (1983) (noting that despite the Clean Air Act's intentional omission
of costs as a factor for the EPA to consider in setting its air quality standards, courts have
held that the EPA cannot enforce infeasible emission limitations and that costs thereby
become relevant in EPA proceedings to enforce emission limitations).
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for a violation is set at the approximate magnitude of compliance costs that the
legislature deems reasonable, and as long as the courts do not affirm or reverse
an overwhelming proportion of rules, regulated entities will comply with the
rule when the actual costs of compliance are much less than the reasonable level
of costs and violate the rule when the costs of compliance are much greater than
the reasonable level of costs. If the legislature's goal is efficient regulation, 68
then it can set the penalty for violation of agency regulations at the dollar value
of social benefits it expects to flow from compliance with these regulations.
Such a penalty will induce regulated entities to comply only as long as the
benefits significantly exceed the costs of compliance.
Compliance remains uncertain only when the costs of complying with a
rule approximately equal the penalty for violating it. In that instance, a
regulated entity's behavior will depend most heavily on its subjective
assessment of the probability that a court will uphold the rule in an enforcement
proceeding. 69 If q is significantly greater than 0.5, the entity will comply with
the rule; if q is significantly less than 0.5, the entity will violate it.
Unpredictable compliance in this context, however, does not impugn delaying
judicial review. Compliance becomes arbitrary precisely because the costs and
benefits of compliance are comparable. In such a situation, there is no clear
social gain or loss from either compliance or violation of the rule.
This dependence on the magnitude of the penalty, however, poses
pragmatic problems for a regulatory scheme, because the level of compliance
costs that are reasonable will vary from context to context. For a large
manufacturer whose violation of a rule threatens to impose millions of dollars
of health and safety costs on society, compliance costs of millions of dollars
may be reasonable. For a mom-and-pop producer, however, that magnitude of
compliance costs would clearly exceed what is reasonable. Hence, Congress
may find it difficult to set a penalty for a rule violation that reflects the
reasonable costs of compliance for every entity. Nonetheless, the task may not
be impossible. Statutes sometimes specify that each individual incident violating
the rule, each site in violation of a rule, and each day of continued violation
68 1 use "efficient" here and throughout this Article to mean wealth maximizing. See
SEIDENFaD, supra note 57, at 49-56 (discussing various notions of economic efficiency and
defining wealth maximization).
69 If X z P, then the criteria for an entity to violate the rule translates into
q < XI(2X+L). Assuming that litigation costs are much less than compliance costs leads to
the conclusion that entities will violate the rule when they believe the probability of a court
upholding the rule is less than 0.5.
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constitute separate violations. 70 In this way, statutes structure the penalty to be
somewhat proportional to the social harm created by a rule violation.
Of greater concern, reasonable compliance costs will also vary from rule to
rule, even for rules adopted under the same authorizing statute. But Congress
does not know in advance what rules the agency will promulgate, so it must
grant the agency discretion in what penalty to seek for a rule violation.
Congress usually merely sets upper bounds on penalties for rule violations. The
analysis above suggests that Congress should not only set such bounds roughly
according to its expectation about the harm caused by such violations, 71 but
should also allow an agency sufficient leeway to impose a penalty that will deter
unreasonable violations. Unfortunately, an agency would have an incentive to
set penalties as high as it can because a greater penalty would induce more
compliance, which in turn would shield the agency from judicial scrutiny of the
rule in an enforcement proceeding. Thus, Congress might need to cabin further
agency discretion about the appropriate penalty for a rule violation. Congress,
however, could do so in several flexible ways. For example, if Congress
desired efficient compliance it could direct the agency to seek a penalty equal to
the expected benefit from compliance with the rule.72 If Congress desired
stricter compliance, it could direct the agency to seek a penalty that exceeds the
expected benefit of compliance but that does not render the option of violating
70 See, e.g., Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2149(b) (1994) (providing that every sale
or lease in violation of the statute, or rule, regulation or order issued pursuant to it, shall
constitute a separate violation, and that each day of a continuing violation constitutes a
separate violation); Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994, 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(1)
(1994) ("[A] separate violation occurs for each day the violation continues and at each office,
branch, or place of business at which a violation occurs or continues."); see also, e.g.,
Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C § 8433(b) (1994) (providing for a
civil penalty of up to "$10 per barrel of petroleum or $3 per Mcf of natural gas used in
operation of [a] powerplant in excess of that authorized").
71 Although many factors go into the maximum penalty provided by statutes, potential
harm from a violation appears to be one factor. This might explain, for example, why
Department of Energy rules governing distribution of special nuclear material (i.e., plutonium
and enriched uranium) cary a maximum penalty of $100,000 per violation, see Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2282(a) (1994), but Department of Agriculture rules
governing the maintenance of orderly market conditions for agricultural products carry a
maximum penalty of $100 per violation, see Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C. § 610(c)
(1994).
72 In numerous instances, Congress has specified that an agency is to consider the
gravity of the violation and harm to the public in determining the amount of a civil penalty for
a rule violation. See, e.g., National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1723i(c)(3) (1994); Interstate
Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1717a(b)(3) (1994); Department of Housing and
Urban Development Reform Act of 1989, 42 U.S.C. § 3545(g)(2) (1994).
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the rule infeasible for the regulated entity. 73 To discourage agency abuse in
setting the penalty, Congress might have to subject the agency's choice of the
magnitude of the penalty, as well as the rule itself, to judicial review.74
B. The Effect of Delaying Judicial Review on the Quality of Judicial
Decisions
Another argument in favor of delaying review of rules to the post-
enforcement stage is that courts will, at that stage, have better information about
the costs of complying with the rule and possibly about the impact of the rule.75
Because of the threat of penalties for noncompliance, entities will frequently
make some effort to comply with rules. Some regulated entities may actually
achieve compliance. Thus, in a suit by an agency for enforcement of a rule, the
court is likely to have before it data about the costs of compliance, and perhaps
about the efficacy of the rule as a means of achieving the agency's goal. In
addition, entities' efforts to comply may reveal unintended consequences of a
rule. All of this information will help a court better evaluate whether the rule
adequately takes account of criticism leveled at it during hard look judicial
review.76
Delaying review to the enforcement stage, however, also means that a
court will conduct its evaluation after regulated entities have made a significant
investment in compliance and the agency has made a significant investment in
73 In many instances, statutes call for agencies to factor a violator's ability to pay into the
determination of a penalty for a rule violation. See, e.g., statutory provisions cited supra note
72.
74 Judicial review might limit agency abuse of discretion in setting penalties, but it might
also create an issue that regulated entities could use to move the ossification of the regulatory
process from the rulemaking to the enforcement stage. C. supra notes 2, 4 and accompanying
text (discussing the literature that blames ossification of the nlemaking process on judicial
review). Because courts often show sympathy for regulatory violators facing significant
penalties, see WILLIAM A. IRwiN Er AL., ENviRoNm ENrAL LAw INsntrE, ENFoRcEmENT
OF FEDERAL AND STATE WATER POLLUTION CoNTRoLs: A REPORT TO TnE NATIONAL
COMMsSION ON WATER QuALITY 208-09 (1975); MENcK, supra note 67, at 195 (noting
how industry used sympathetic district courts to stymie EPA efforts to enforce Clean Air Act
state implementation plan requirements), subjecting the magnitude of the penalty for a rule
violation to meaningful judicial review is likely to encourage violators to challenge
enforcement actions brought against them.
75 See Mashaw, supra note 8, at 233-34.
76 C.f Paul M. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Infonnal Rulemaldng, 60 VA. L. REV. 185,
205 (1974) (noting that the availability of pre-enforcement review changes the focus of the
court from the facts surrounding the application of the rule to the rulemaking process itself,
which in mm will trigger more vigorous judicial scrutiny).
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enforcement. Moreover, at this stage, the interested parties may have adjusted
to the rule, so that overturning it could upset expectations of the public affected
by the rule and thereby foment political instability concerning an issue that had
settled on the political backburner.77 The costs of overturning a rule at this
stage are much greater than the costs of overturning a rule before enforcement.
In fact, sunken investment costs and settled expectations might make
enforcement of the rule the best option for the court even though the court
could have increased social welfare by overturning the rule prior to investments
in compliance and enforcement. A reviewing court might hesitate to overturn a
rule at this late stage even if the extra data available to the court shows that the
rule was not justified in the first place.
The controversy about the scrubbing of coal, which Bruce Ackerman and
Richard Hassler so aptly illuminated,78 illustrates how delaying enforcement
might induce a court to uphold a bad rule. In that controversy, eastern coal
interests and environmentalists formed a coalition that led the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to set a standard for emissions from new coal-fired
power plants that essentially required coal scrubbing. 79 Ackerman and Hassler
persuasively demonstrated that a more flexible standard allowing the burning of
clean coal could have resulted in greater reductions in harm from air pollution
at significantly less cost.80 Once power plants installed scrubbers, however, it
would have made little sense for a court to overturn the standard, because
scrubbing was too expensive.
Despite the arguments above, there is some reason to remain optimistic that
delaying judicial review of rules will improve the quality of judicial review in a
certain class of cases. As previously noted, in some cases the issue facing the
reviewing court is the feasibility or cost of compliance with the rule. 81
Regulated entities are likely to have better information than the court and even
the agency regarding such issues. In other words, the quality of judicial review
in such cases would improve if the courts could get regulated entities to reveal
77 Rulemaking can be viewed as a process by which the President and each house of
Congress reach an equilibrium position about regulatory policy. This equilibrium depends
greatly on the initial position staked out by the agency rule. See Matthew D. McCubbins et
al., Stncture and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political
Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REv. 431, 437 (1989). So viewed, the potential for political
foment from the judiciary upsetting this equilibrium becomes obvious.
78 See BRUCE A. AcKmAN & WniJAM T. HASsLER, CLEAN CoAiDiRTY Am: OR
How =a CLEAN Am Acr BECAME A MULTIBILmON-DOLLAR BAn-OuT FOR THE HIGH
SULpHUR COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DoNE ABoUT IT (1981).
79 See id. at 31-33 (describing the formation of the coalition between environmentalists
and eastern coal producers that led to the scrubbing requirement).
80 See id. at 88-103.
81 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
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such information truthfully. The rub, however, lies in the fact that these entities
will face increased burdens and costs if the court upholds the rule, so they have
every incentive to overstate the problems the rule will cause.82 Reverting to the
formalism of game theory, what the judiciary needs is a mechanism that gets
regulated entities to signal by their actions when they believe a rule is not
overly onerous. 83
Intuitively, one might surmise that delaying judicial review to the post-
enforcement stage may enable such a mechanism to operate. When judicial
review is delayed, regulated entities face the prospect of a penalty for
noncompliance if the rule is upheld in the enforcement proceeding. On the one
hand, if they evaluate the rule and believe that it is valid, then they are apt to
think a court will uphold the rule and hence are unlikely to refuse to comply. In
such a situation, an entity must figure that its fellow regulatees will also
conclude that the rule is valid. An entity that violates such a rule thus opens
itself to a substantial likelihood that others will comply, which reinforces the
probability that a reviewing court will uphold the rule. This in turn would result
in the entity having to pay a penalty and, perhaps more significantly, finding
itself behind its competitors in steps to comply with a rule.84 On the other hand,
if the entity evaluates the rule and believes it to be invalid, then the entity can
be much more secure in a decision not to comply. It can count on its fellow
regulatees not to comply as well, and if no entities comply, the court is likely to
reverse the rule as infeasible or unreasonable.8 5 Thus, faced with a rule that the
82 Cf Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMN. L.
Rnv. 363, 388 (1986) (noting that industry self-interest interferes with agencies' ability to get
information from the industry).
83 See DouGLAS G. BAeD Er AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 122-23 (1994)
(defining "[s]ignalling [as taking] place when those who possess nonverifiable information can
convey that information in the way they choose their actions").
84 If an entity were subject to an injunction to keep it from violating a rule, delay in
compliance could jeopardize the entity's ability to sell its product altogether. Such a delay in
steps towards compliance would put the entity at an extreme competitive disadvantage. In
most enforcement proceedings, however, courts hesitate to force production to grind to a halt
because of a rule violation. See MEmLCK, supra note 67, at 217 (stating, with regard to
enforcement of Clean Air Act regulations, that "[e]ven those courts that have shown most
sympathy for environmental causes have held that courts must use their equity power to
fashion reasonable compliance schedules instead of issuing prohibitory injunctions").
85 Moreover, even if the court did enforce the nle, the entity would be in the same
position as its competitors of having to pay the penalty, and thus would not be relatively
disadvantaged. It could pass some of the costs of the penalty on to its customers and would
suffer only the lost profits from the decrease in demand caused by the higher price throughout
the industry. See SEmNFaD, supra note 57, at 64 (describing the different impact of a firm
bearing a unique cost increase versus the entire industry having to bear the cost).
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entity considers invalid, the entity will reason that violating the rule will save it
the costs of compliance and will not subject it to any penalty. For rules whose
validity hinge on information known uniquely to regulated entities, courts can
use these entities' very decisions whether to comply as signals about the rules'
validity. 86
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards for
allowable levels of toxic substances in the workplace provide an excellent
example of rules for which signaling might have aided judicial review. 87 Once
OSHA finds that a toxic substance poses a significant risk to workers' health at
levels above those allowed by its standard, the validity of the standard hinges on
whether the standard is feasible. 88 Determining the feasibility of a standard is
not an easy exercise, 89 and courts have on numerous occasions struggled to
assess the feasibility of particular standards. 90 If challenges to the feasibility of
such standards could be brought only in enforcement proceedings, reviewing
courts would have before them data about any industry attempts to comply with
86 To use the terminology of game theory, intuition suggests that the following set of
strategies represents a perfect Bayesian equilibrium: a regulated entity believes that other
regulated entities will comply with a rule that the entity finds to be reasonable, and the entity
will itself comply; a regulated entity believes that other regulated entities will not comply with
a rule that the entity finds unreasonable, and the entity itself will not comply; all entities
believe that a reviewing court will uphold a rule with which some entities comply and reverse
a rule with which no entity complies, and the courts act consistently with these beliefs. A set
of strategies is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium when "in the proposed equilibrium, a player's
actions are the best response, given that player's beliefs and the actions and beliefs of the
other players." BAIRD, stpra note 83, at 84; see also RAsmuSEN, supra note 19, at 146
(giving a more general, and more technical, definition of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium).
87 OSHA standards for toxic substances in the workplace are governed by the definition
of "occupational safety and health standard," 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1994) and provisions
related specifically to standards for toxics, see 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1994).
88 See Industrial Union Dep't., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
643 n.48 (1980).
89 The task is made more difficult by the fact that OSHA toxic substance standards must
be both technologically and economically feasible. See American Textile Mfr. Inst. v.
Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 513 n.31 (1982).
90 See, e.g., National Cottonseed Products Ass'n. v. Brock, 825 F.2d 482, 487-88
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (affirming the feasibility of an OSHA regulation requiring continuing
medical monitoring of those whose health has been affected by cottondust); United
Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1263-1308 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting the difficulty
of reviewing the feasibility of an OSHA standard before affirming standards for exposure to
lead in certain industries and reversing such standards in other industries); Industrial Union
Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 477-78 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (remanding part of the workplace
standards for exposure to asbestos because the Secretary of Labor had failed to show that a
stricter standard was not feasible).
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the rule, and perhaps would even have examples of companies that did comply.
Almost universal compliance would seriously undercut arguments that the
standard was not feasible, regardless of the definition of feasibility that one
uses.
As attractive as this signaling scenario sounds, a rigorous game theoretic
analysis demonstrates that such signaling will occur only to a limited extent. I
evaluate the effect of courts using compliance behavior as a signal of rule
validity using a slight generalization of the same two-entity game used to
analyze compliance. Instead of specifying a single probability that a reviewing
court will uphold the rule, the game assumes two such probabilities: q, denotes
the probability that a court will affirm a rule and thus impose a penalty when
one of the two entities complies with the rule; q2 denotes the probability that a
court will affirm the rule if both entities violate the rule. Some sort of signaling
occurs if the fact of compliance by one entity increases the likelihood that a
court will uphold the rule over the probability that occurs when neither entity
complies-that is, when q, is greater than q2. The payoff matrix for the game is
as follows:
Chrysler Complies Chrysler Violates
G.M. complies (-X, -X) (-X, -q[X+P]-L)
G.M. violates (-q[X+P]-L, -X) (-q2[X+P]-L, -%[X+P]-L)
Perfect signaling occurs if a court affirms a rule every time one entity
complies but always reverses when neither complies. In that case, the payoff
table reduces to the following:
Chrysler Complies Chrysler Violates
G.M. complies (-X, -X) (-X, -[X+P+L])
G.M. violates (-[X+P+L], -X) (-L, -L)
If litigation costs are less than compliance costs, as they usually are, this
game has two Nash equilibria: one in which every entity complies and another
in which no entity complies. Starting from either of these two strategies, neither
G.M. nor Chrysler can unilaterally improve its payoffs by altering its conduct.
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Unfortunately, whether compliance costs exceed litigation costs says little about
the reasonableness of a rule.91 Thus, both equilibria can exist for both
reasonable and unreasonable rules. In other words, even were the rule
unreasonable, all entities might comply with it, and even were the rule
reasonable, all entities might violate it. Given the existence of two equilibria,
the outcome of the game is indeterminate. Nonetheless, one might reasonably
predict that neither entity will comply with the rule regardless of its perceived
validity because the equilibrium {Violate, Violate} leaves both entities better off
than the alternative {Comply, Comply}.92 If compliance costs greatly exceed
the sum of litigation costs and the penalty, as they often do, then the outcome
that neither entity will comply is even more likely. All each entity has to lose by
violating the rule if another entity complies with it is their litigation costs plus
the penalty, while they may avoid the much more significant compliance costs
if every entity decides not to comply. 93
9 1 If litigation costs exceed compliance costs for an individual entity, then the unique
Nash equilibrium is for both Chrysler and G.M. to comply. To the extent that total social
litigation costs exceed total social compliance costs, the administrative costs of reaching a
judicial resolution cannot justify the benefits of such a resolution. In such a situation, this
unique equilibrium would be desirable. But the validity of a rule can be tested by one entity,
which alone bears litigation costs, while every regulated entity bears the compliance costs.
Therefore, that L > X does not imply that the social costs of litigation exceed the social costs
of compliance. In short, if L > X, the unique equilibrium may or may not be efficient.
92 In other words, the equilibrium {Violate, Violate} is Pareto superior to that of
{Comply, Comply}. See RASMUSEN, supra note 19, at 26 (positing that most modelers would
predict the "Pareto efficient equilibrium" as the outcome); see also, e.g., JoHN C. HARSANYI
& RmmItARD SELTEN, A GENERAL THEORY OF EQuffaBRIM SEI..EcnoN IN GAMES 80-81
(1988) (arguing that such "payoff dominant" outcomes are natural focal points for players);
R. DUNCAN LucE & HowARD RAFA, GAMES AmD DEcsioNs 106-07 (1957) (eliminating
any Pareto-dominated equilibria from consideration as an admissible Nash solution). But see
Russell W. Cooper et al., Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental
Results, 80 AM. ECON. REv. 218, 226-29 (1990) (reporting empirical results showing that
players often do not choose a Pareto superior equilibrium over other Nash equilibria).
93 Given the posited relationship of the various costs, an entity is likely to treat X the
same as X+P+L, but find L significantly different from X. Hence, players will focus on the
strategy of violating the rule as promising an appreciable reward. See THOMAs C.
SCHEaNG, TiE STRATEGY OF CoNFucr 60 (1960) (introducing the notion of focal points as
a means of predicting the outcome of coordination games in which players cannot
communicate); see also BAIRD, supra note 83, at 39-40 (noting that players tend to reach the
equilibrium that is a "focal point"); cf. HARSANYi & SELTEN, supra note 92, at 82-84
(arguing that players will consider the risks of what they have to lose by playing particular
strategies each of which might lead to an equilibrium); RASMUSEN, supra note 19, at 27
(noting that the fear of a large loss from the other player deviating from a rational strategy
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One needs to change the game in two ways to make compliance a more
likely strategy when a rule is reasonable and violation more likely when the rule
is unreasonable. First, consistent with the lack of a reliable signal from
noncompliance, courts must treat the signal as an imperfect one: they can
presumptively affirm rules with which some entity complies, but must evaluate
the reasonableness of those with which no entity complies somewhat
independently. By doing so, courts expose entities to some risk of penalty even
when none comply with the rule. 94 In addition, just as in the game modeling
efficient compliance, statutes authorizing rules must specify penalties of
approximately the same magnitude as compliance costs that the legislature
considers reasonable. Given these two modifications to the game (and ignoring
litigation costs, which are usually significantly lower than compliance costs) the
payoff table becomes as follows:
Chrysler Complies Chrysler Violates
G.M. complies (-X, -X) (-X, -[X+P])
G.M. violates (-[X+P], -X) (-q2[X+P], -q2[X+P])
For this matrix, if the rule is reasonable (i.e., P> >X), then the only
equilibrium is for each entity to comply. If the rule is unreasonable (i.e.,
P< <X),95 then there are again two equilibria: in one, every entity complies
may deter players who cannot coordinate their behavior from reaching the efficient
equilibrium).
941 assume in the analysis below that an independent evaluation will result in courts
affirming rules with which no entity complies with an approximate probability of 0.5. This is
consistent with historical affirmance rates for rulemaking. See Schuck & Elliott, supra note
27, at 1022 (finding a long-term affinance rate of 43.9% of challenged rules).
95 If P ;z X, then the rule is neither patently reasonable nor unreasonable, and social
welfare is not greatly affected by the court either affirming or reversing the rule. See supra
note 69 and accompanying text. The standard rhetoric, that a court should not substitute its
judgment for that of the agency as long as the agency decision is not patently unreasonable,
see, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfr's Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-
43 (1983); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971); see also
PETER STRAUss, AN IhTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRAIvE JusncE IN THE UNrIED STATEs
261-64 (1989) (discussing how courts apply the arbitrary and capricious standard of judicial
review in an attempt to leave policymaking discretion to the agencies and yet ensure that the
agencies do not act unreasonably), would nonetheless promote efficiency by discouraging
entities from challenging such marginal rules, thereby saving society the administrative cost of
having a court resolve the case.
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with the rule and in the other every entity violates the rule. Thus, the outcome
is once again not entirely determinate. However, because P is much less than
X, each entity risks a greater loss by complying with the rule than by violating
it, and universal violation of the rule remains the best prediction. 96 Thus, a
court facing a rule that all regulated entities have violated should retain some
legitimate concerns about the reasonableness of the rule. In sum, the
compliance behavior of the entities is likely to provide some signal to the courts
of the validity of the rule, albeit an imperfect one.
If regulated entities have some way of coordinating their behavior,
imperfect signaling may even drive regulated entities to adopt determinate
strategies. For example, a rule that requires entities to commit to publicly
observable conduct prior to compliance is one for which partial signaling may
be extremely reliable. In this situation, the game becomes one of sequential
decisionmaking. One entity waits for the other to begin to comply. As soon as
the first entity sees the second begin, it too takes steps to comply. If the first
entity never makes an attempt to comply, the second does not either. Modeling
this situation requires resort to the extensive form for the game.97 Assuming for
the sake of concreteness that G.M. is the first player, that form of the game
looks as follows:
G.M.
complies violates
CHRYSLER
complies violates complies violates
(-X, -X) (-X, -[X+P]) (-[X+P,-X) (-q2 [X+PI, -q2[X+P])
The outcome to such a game can be derived by working backwards. If the
rule is reasonable, Chrysler will comply regardless of what G.M. does. G.M.,
knowing this, will maximize its payoff by also complying. If the rule is
unreasonable, G.M. knows that Chrysler will comply only if G.M. does, but
will not comply if G.M. violates the rule. This leaves G.M. facing the
following simplified game:
96 See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
97 See BAIRD, supra note 83, at 51 (defining the extensive form for specifying a game);
RASMUSEN, supra note 19, at 37-39 (same).
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G.M.
complies violates
(-x, -x) (-q2[X+P],-q2[X +P,]
G.M. will maximize its payoff by violating the rule, which means Chrysler
will do the same. Thus, if the rule is reasonable the unique outcome is for both
entities to comply with it; if the rule is unreasonable, the unique outcome is for
both entities to violate it.9 8
This entire analysis demonstrates that signaling provides only a limited
means for post-enforcement review to improve the quality of judicial
monitoring of agency policy. Signaling cannot be perfect. Although courts
considering enforcement actions should take into account whether regulated
entities have complied with a rule in assessing its reasonableness, courts must
continue to assess the justifications for rules with which no entity complies, and
uphold such rules in some cases to keep these entities honest. In addition,
signaling depends critically on the penalty imposed for violating the rule. If the
penalty is much lower than the anticipated compliance costs, entities will have
little incentive to comply with the rule, regardless of whether they find it
reasonable. If the penalty for failure to comply with a rule is greater than
reasonable compliance costs, and there is some chance that a court will uphold
the rule even in the face of industry noncompliance, regulated entities may try
to comply with rules that they find unreasonable.
Finally, there are situations in which signaling simply will not occur. In
particular, signaling cannot occur when regulated entities do not have superior
information about the effects of rules. Thus, when the validity of a rule depends
98 This conclusion is highly counterintuitive. Usually, the ability of entities to
communicate before committing to behavior permits them to collude to avoid sending signals
against their common interest. In particular, according to a repeated game analysis, the ability
of a firm in an industry to observe deviations of its rivals from conduct that is optimal to the
industry as a whole removes a major impediment to such tacit collusion. See BAMD, supra
note 83, at 174. Thus, intuitively one would predict that the need for each entity to commit to
observable conduct prior to compliance would induce noncompliance by every entity. In fact,
without the threat that a court might uphold a penalty even if all the entities collude not to
comply, a game theoretic analysis predicts the usual outcome of universal noncompliance. See
App: Analysis of Signaling when the Court Imposes No Penalty in Case of Universal
Violation and Entities Can Coordinate Their Compliance Behavior.
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upon predictions about its efficacy, or the possibility of unintended
consequences, rather than on the rule's direct costs, signaling is unlikely to
occur. For example, the manner in which the Supreme Court ultimately
interpreted the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1976 (OSH Act)99 in the
Benzene case would have rendered signaling unhelpful: The Court read the
OSH Act as requiring OSHA to make a threshold finding that benzene posed an
actual health risk at levels of exposure prohibited by the rule at issue.1°° It is
unlikely that industry would have any comparative advantage over the agency
in obtaining the information needed to make this finding. Overall, the extent to
which delaying review to the post-enforcement stage will improve the
judiciary's ability to filter good rules from bad ones remains unclear.
C. The Effect of Delaying Judicial Review on the Quality of Agency
Policymaking
Delaying review to the post-enforcement stage retains the meaningful
scrutiny courts currently give to agency rules. 10 1 Implicit in a desire to retain
such review is an assumption that the current stringency of review-some
variant of the hard look test-serves an important function in monitoring agency
decisionmaking to ensure that the agency considered all factors relevant to the
legality and wisdom of a rule. 102 To the extent that hard look review gives
agencies an incentive to deliberate carefully before adopting a rule, a system of
post-enforcement review retains such incentives.
The care that an agency takes in adopting a rule, however, can depend on
the likelihood that a court will review the rule as well as the stringency of that
review. The toughest judicial test will have little effect on agency deliberation if
the agency knows that its rule will never face a challenge in court. By similar
reasoning, at the margin, reducing the likelihood of a challenge to any rule is
99 29 U.S.C. § 651-678 (1994).
100 See Industrial Union, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 637-38
(1980).
101 The retention of meaningful scrutiny seems to be one of the reasons that Mashaw
prefers delaying review to revamping the standards of review. See Mashaw, supra note 8, at
235 (noting that changing the timing of review preserves "the traditional individual 'right' to
independent judicial judgment").
102 Elsewhere, I have argued explicitly that meaningful judicial review serves a valuable
function in limiting capture and the imposition of idiosyncratic regulatory values by the
administrative bureaucracy. See Seidenfeld, supra note 3; Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic
Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1547-50, 1570
(1992) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification]; see also Seidenfeld, supra
note 49, at 127-30 (describing the benefits of judicial review of agency reasoning in statutory
interpretation).
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likely to decrease the effect of judicial review on the agency's processes.
Whether one deems this decreased impact wholesome depends on whether one
believes that judicial review has a salutary effect on agency decisionmaking. l0 3
The key point is that one cannot have it both ways: one cannot contend that
reducing the likelihood of judicial review will deossify rulemaking processes
while simultaneously arguing that it will not compromise the impact of judicial
review on the care agencies take in adopting rules.
Delaying review until the post-enforcement stage, moreover, threatens to
introduce a significant pro-industry bias into any administrative regulatory
scheme. Such delay altogether prohibits beneficiaries of regulation from
challenging rules as too lenient on regulated entities. Under current pre-
enforcement doctrine, interest groups representing the public affected by a rule
can challenge that rule on par with regulated entities. But such interest groups
are not directly subject to the rule, and hence cannot choose to violate it in
order to force a judicial test of the rule. Without the prospect of judicial
challenges by beneficiaries, agencies have no legal incentive to accede to the
positions of these beneficiaries, no matter how persuasive. Delaying review
thus would return the rulemaking process to the legal process era during which
it was assumed that political controls were sufficient to ensure that agencies
acted on behalf of the public interest in administering regulatory programs. 104
103 Although my view that judicial review serves a valuable function is shared by some,
see, e.g., Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 507,
556 (1985) (judicial review can help prevent an agency from deviating from congressional
intent due to political pressures); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law,
38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 61-62 (1985) (explaining how "hard look" review facilitates the goals
of deliberative democracy), it is not universally accepted. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 8, at
251-52 (accepting the need for judicial review primarily because the legal culture in the
United States seems to demand it); McGarity, supra note 2, at 1451-53 (acknowledging
benefits of judicial review but asserting that hard look review should be softened); Pierce,
supra note 16, at 67 (stating pessimism about whether judicial review bestows any benefits on
the regulatory process).
104 For a description of the legal process conception of administrative law, see Keith
Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 567, 576-83
(1992). Under the legal process conception, the primary role of the courts was to protect
regulated entities from zealous agencies over-stepping their statutory bounds. See Garland,
supra note 103, at 510; Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1667, 1680 (stating that the courts' aim [during the era following the
New Deal] was to "promote formal justice in order to protect private autonomy").
Assurances that agencies performed their jobs of furthering the interest of the general public
was supposedly provided by the professionalism of administrators and political constraints.
See id. at 1682.
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Today, however, students of regulatory history are all too familiar with the
scenarios of capture to which such assumptions can lead. 105
Mashaw seems to be aware of this potential; he hints in a footnote that the
problem can be alleviated by allowing beneficiaries of regulation to seek pre-
enforcement review after posting a bond that they forfeit if they lose their
challenge. 106 If such a bond were set approximately equal to the benefit that the
beneficiary would derive from having the rule reversed, it would provide a
penalty analogous to one that regulated entities face for noncompliance. Such a
bonding scheme, however, raises problems of its own, not the least of which is
the likely rejection by the American polity of a regulatory scheme that imposes
a penalty for seeking to have courts evaluate the legitimacy of agency action. 1
7
Moreover, such a scheme might run afoul of the recognized constitutional right
of access to the courts. 108
105 See MARvER H. BERNsTEI , REGULATING BusINEss BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION
86-91 (1955); Louis M. KoHLMI, JR., THE REGULATORS: WATCHDOG AGENcIES AND
TiH PuBr-uc INTEREsr 69-82 (1969); Linda R. Hirshman, Postmodern Jurisprudence and the
Problem of Administrative Discretion, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 646, 656 (1988); see also JAMES
M. LANDiS, REPORT ON THE REGULATORY AGENcIES TO THE PRSENT ELECT 70-72 (1960)
(recognizing the need for adversarial representation of the public's interest in the
administrative process, but falling short of recommending that the public's representative be
given authority to seek judicial review of an agency decision).
106 See Mashaw, supra note 8, at 229 n.115.
107 Mashaw's advocacy of post-enforcement review is predicated in part on his belief
that the American polity would find disturbing a scheme that freed agencies from meaningful
judicial scrutiny. See id. at 208, 231, 233, 252 (contrasting the political acceptability of
delaying judicial review with that of making the standard of review more forgiving). He does
not explain why a requirement that rule beneficiaries pay for access to the courts would be
any more acceptable to the American public.
108 See Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 742-43 (1983) (in
light of the First Amendment right of access to the courts, the NLRB could not enjoin a well-
founded lawsuit by an employer even if that suit was filed in retaliation for an employee's
exercise of his rights under the NLRA); Harrison v. Springdale Water & Sewer Comm'n,
780 F.2d 1422, 1427 (8th Cir. 1986) (citing numerous cases holding that the government
cannot threaten an individual as a means of deterring legitimate law suits); cf. Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 78-79 (1972) (holding that an Oregon statute requiring tenants to post a
bond equal to twice the rent due in order to appeal an adverse eviction ruling violated the
Equal Protection Clause, and emphasizing that such a bond would deter non-frivolous appeals
by those unable to afford it). In order to provide the threat of penalty to beneficiaries that will
deter petitions for review, it is not enough for the bond to merely cover harm caused by a
party obtaining a judicial stay of a rule pending its review. Such a bond might be less
politically problematic, as it would only require petitioners to cover any injury caused by their
challenge. Certainly, this type of bond would not raise the same constitutional concerns as an
out-and-out penalty for bringing a suit that ultimately proved unsuccessful. See id. at 77-78
[Vol. 58:85
PLAYING GAMES
IV. SELECTIVE USE OF POST-ENFORCEMENT REVIEW
When all is said and done, even if a regulatory scheme could provide
penalties that induce efficient compliance, the case for exclusive post-
enforcement review of rules is not open and shut. For many rules, barring pre-
enforcement review will adversely affect the quality of the administrative
decision or judicial review. Such a bar also extends the period during which
regulated entities remain uncertain about the rule's ultimate validity because of
the potential for subsequent judicial reversal. 109 Therefore, delaying judicial
review does not appear to be a panacea for all ossification of agency
rulemaking.
Perhaps the most significant factor in the calculus of the relevant benefit of
pre-enforcement review is the extent to which judicial reversal of the rule at the
enforcement stage threatens industry with significant wasted investment. In
situations involving such a threat, delaying review to the post-enforcement stage
exposes regulated entities to enormous risks. By complying, such entities risk
investment made in reliance on the rule if the rule is subsequently overturned
on review. By not complying, the entities risk having to pay penalties and
falling behind others in the industry who decided to comply." 0 In addition, the
greater the threat of substantial stranded investment the greater the bias of the
ultimate regulatory outcome against the affected public-the intended
beneficiaries of a regulatory program. Judges will understandably hesitate to
reverse rules if reversal leads directly to wasted assets.111 For this reason, suits
(requiring bonds to cover potential costs imposed on a landlord by a tenant's appeal would be
constitutional); cf Bill Johnson's Restaurants, 461 U.S. at 743 (the First Amendment does
not protect access to the courts to file baseless lawsuits). But this more limited bond
frequently would not threaten the penalty needed to deter pre-enforcement suits by
beneficiaries of regulation. A court often can review a rule prior to its scheduled effective
date, in which case no stay (and hence no bond) would be required. In many other cases, the
beneficiaries of the regulation are upset that regulation does not go far enough. In these cases,
regulated entities would not suffer harm from a stay of the rule, and hence beneficiaries would
not have to post a bond for bringing a pre-enforcement rule challenge.
10 9 See Pierce & Shapiro, supra note 38, at 1193 (noting that delays due to remands
increase the uncertainty perceived by regulatory entities about a rule's validity, "causing the
deferral of major investment decisions").
110 The Supreme Court's decision holding that pre-enforcement review of rules is
presumptively available relied greatly on freeing regulated entities from the dilemma of
having to invest in compliance or face penalties. See Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,
152-53 (1967).
111 1 am reminded of a case that I argued defending the routing of an electric
transmission line by the New York State Public Service Commission (PSC). See Delaney v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 507 N.Y.S.2d 471 (2d Dep't 1986). The line was to cost $500 million,
1997]
OHIO STATE LAIW JOURNAL
by intended beneficiaries challenging a rule with which industry has decided to
comply are not likely to succeed.
On the other side of the equation is the threat to the beneficiaries from
industry refusals to comply. To the extent that delays in compliance pending
judicial review impose substantial costs on the public, society is made better off
by coercing prereview compliance. Even if threats of penalties are so great that
they dissuade all judicial challenges by regulated entities and this lack of judicial
review in turn leads the agency to adopt nonoptimal rules, the costs of delayed
compliance might still justify preclusion of pre-enforcement review. The
balance depends upon the detrimental impact of the deviation of the rules from
optimality compared to the cost of delay that results from encouraging
challenges by allowing pre-enforcement review. 112 In short, an adequate rule
that takes effect quickly may be better than an excellent rule with which
industry will not comply for years.
A third significant factor in the balance is the ability of judicial review to
encourage more careful deliberation by an agency about an issue raised in a
rulemaking. Unfortunately, the net benefits that are likely to flow from the
impact of delaying judicial review of rule challenges on the administrative
decisionmaking process are not easy to assess.113 On the one hand, delaying
judicial review will tend to discourage challenges altogether. Free from judicial
oversight, an agency might make an unwise decision, perhaps to further an
immediate political agenda or the idiosyncratic goals of a regulatory office
within the agency, 114 or perhaps simply to avoid devoting the resources
and by the time the court heard the case, the Power Authority of the State of New York had
already spent $150 million clearing the route and designing the line for that route. I made
certain to point out to the judges that a reversal of the PSC approved route would result in a
total waste of that $150 million dollar investment. For another example explaining judicial
hesitancy to reverse rules resulting in wasted assets, see supra notes 78-80 and accompanying
text.
1 12 See Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Protection as a Learning Experience, 27 Loy.
L.A. L. REv. 791, 804 (1994) (noting the trade-off between optimality of rules and the delay
in formulating and enforcing them).
113 See Mashaw, supra note 8, at 202; Administrative Law Symposiwn: Question &
Answer with Professors Elliott, Strauss, and Sunstein, 1989 DuKE L.J. 551, 552-55
(discussing the impact of hard look review on agency deliberative processes) [hereinafter
Administrative Law Symposiwn].
114 See Administrative Law Symposium, supra note 113, at 554 (remarks of Cass
Sunstein noting that NHTSA's decision to shelve the requirement that automobiles be
equipped with airbags was based on a political hit list, and not on any evaluation of the merits
of the regulation); Pedersen, supra note 48, at 56-59; Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 506-07.
But see Administrative Law Symposiwn, supra note 113, at 556-57 (response of Elliott
[Vol. 58:85
PLAYING GAMES
necessary to make the best decision about a complex problem. 115 On the other
hand, delaying judicial review would give the court a more concrete factual
setting in which to assess the reasonableness of the agency's predictions. 116
Thus, delaying judicial review might prevent the reviewing court from
requiring analyses that cost much more to prepare than the information they
generate is worth. Avoiding these counterproductive judicial demands, in turn,
would obviate the need for the agency to perform as many studies and analyses
as possible to convince the court that the agency took such predictions
seriously, even if the studies have only marginal value in guiding the agency to
regulate wisely.
Finally, my previous analysis of the possibility of a court reading signals
from regulated entities' compliance behavior suggests a limited class of cases
for which delaying judicial review might benefit both the rulemaking and
review processes. If the legality or wisdom of a rule hinges on information best
known to regulated entities, and Congress can provide a penalty that measures
the social harm from a violation of the rule, then delaying review can create an
efficient incentive for these entities to reveal when they believe the rule is valid.
Such revelations would provide information to the court about regulated
entities' true beliefs regarding the validity of a rule and thereby reduce the need
for the agency to generate and analyze data merely to convince a court that its
rule was justified. Such information might also improve the quality of judicial
review, for instance by alerting courts to challenges based on makeweight
issues that the regulated entities and agency know to be tangential to the real
controversies created by a rule.1 17
In short, the factors that go into the balance of whether pre-enforcement
review of a rulemaking is warranted are too diverse to permit a simple answer
that either pre-enforcement or post-enforcement review is always best. The
diversity of the factors that enter into this balance suggests perhaps that courts
should decide issue by issue whether to allow pre-enforcement review. In fact,
these factors overlap substantially with those Abbott Laboratories purports to
apply to determine whether a rule is ripe for review prior to its application. 118
questioning whether empowering lawyers within agencies, rather than technical staff, is
beneficial).
115 Cy Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification, supra note 102, at 1564 (asserting
that policing by private interest groups able to challenge agency action in court is necessary to
counter agency lethargy).116 See Mashaw, supra note 8, at 235 (delaying review until the post-enforcement stage
focuses issues and gives courts a better information base to evaluate rule challenges).
117 See Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 496-98 (detailing judicial uncertainty about the
significance of issues raised by a rule challenge).
118 See Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967); see also Toilet Goods Ass'n
v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 162-65 (1967) (holding that pre-enforcement challenge to rules
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A rule that imposes compliance costs that would go to waste were a court
ultimately to strike down the rule is a classic example of a rule that imposes a
hardship on the parties subject to it.l19 Under the language of Abbott
Laboratories, parties should be able to challenge such a rule immediately after
its adoption. A rule whose validity depends on information distinctly within the
knowledge of regulated entities, however, would be a good candidate for one
not fit for judicial review until these entities are forced to reveal that
information, for instance by the threat of a penalty for failure to comply.
Hence, the analysis above supports implementing Mashaw's proposal of
delaying review simply by having courts stick more rigorously to the language
in Abbott Laboratories, rather than read that case as justifying pre-enforcement
review absent unique circumstances.
That the courts have not applied the Abbott Laboratories factors in such a
literal fashion, however, suggests that the analysis, up to this point, has also
ignored some countervailing considerations. One such consideration is the cost
of uncertainty inherent in any scheme of ad hoc decisionmaking. Under a case-
by-case determination of the availability of pre-enforcement review, the agency
would not know beforehand whether an issue will be subject to such review.
Faced with the possibility that a court will decide to review the issue before
enforcement, a review-averse agency will invest in the full panoply of analyses
and internal checks that led to ossification in the first place. 120 In other words,
agencies' aversion to reversal of rules may be so great that the uncertainty that
inheres in a case-by-case determination of whether a rule is subject to pre-
enforcement challenge may lead an agency to perform the very overcautious
data collection and analysis that the prospect of delayed review sought to
obviate. 121
was not ripe because evaluation of the rule would depend on how the Commissioner of Food
and Drugs would apply it, and because the rule did not directly mandate conduct but rather
authorized agency inspections of premises).
119 Abbott Laboratories itself, in holding the rule at issue ripe for pre-enforcement
review, relied on investments that petitioners would have to make to comply with the rule.
See Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 152-53.
120 Agencies tend to be "review-averse" because judicial reversal of a rule imposes costs
that go beyond investments in the particular rule. See MENEoFF, supra note 36, at 121
(asserting that reversal of a rule not only wastes investment in developing the rule and delays
protection to the rule's beneficiaries, but also "deflate[s] the morale of the [agency] staff' and
weakens the agency's ability to fend off political attacks).
121 Most commentators that have criticized active judicial review of agency rulemaking
have blamed the ossification it causes on the uncertainty to which active review exposes
agencies. See Mashaw, supra note 8, at 203; see also, e.g., KENNEm CuLp DAvis &
RICIARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMM SRATE LAW TREATsE § 7.4, at 311-13 (3d ed. 1994) (the
real impediment created by judicial review is uncertainty); Thomas 0. McGarity, Regudatory
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A second consideration militating against case-by-case determination of the
timing of review is the impropriety of judicial evaluation of whether a
threatened penalty was meant to induce compliance as a signal of rule validity.
To perform such an evaluation in the absence of direction from Congress
requires that a court determine whether the penalty threatened for a rule
violation measures the social harm that one would expect, e ante, to flow from
the violation. But harms from rule violations often include interference with
interests for which there is no market value or for which the market cannot
accurately measure the full social cost. 122 Valuing such a harm requires
expertise about how strongly the populace as a whole feels about the harmed
interest, and at present there appears to be no objective means of measuring
such harm. 123 In addition, rule violations affect symbolic interests that cannot
Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 65 Tax. L. REv. 1243, 1290 (1987) (the types of issues an
agency must address in a rulemaking and the nature of judicial review place the agency
"awash in a sea of uncertainties"); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives
and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DuKE L.J. 1051,
1064 (1995) (arguing that, in reviewing agency decisions, judicial incentives will lead courts
to formulate doctrines that maintain indeterminacy of outcomes in particular cases).
122 For example, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA) creates a cause of action for "damages for injury to... natural
resources." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (1994). The courts have interpreted this provision to
require compensation for harm not only to use values, but also to nonuse values. See Ohio v.
Department of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 462-64 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (reversing DOI's
decision to limit damages to the diminution in use values); see also Note, 'Ask a Silly
Question... ": Contingent Valuation of Natural Resource Damages, 105 HARV. L. REv.
1981, 1981 (1992) (describing nonuse values as including the value of the option to use the
resource in the future, the value of the opportunity to leave the resource to future generations,
and the value of merely knowing that the resource exists).
123 Since nonuse valuation requires estimating the value to those who make no
commitment that might indicate their valuation of a good, methods based on shadow markets
cannot accurately assess such value. See Richard B. Stewart, Liability for Natural Resource
Injury: Beyond Tort, in ANALYZING SUPERFUND: ECONOMICS, SCIENCE, AND LAw 219, 234
(Richard L. Revesz & Richard B. Stewart eds., 1995). To capture nonuse values, courts
would have to utilize contingent valuation. See National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, Release of Contingent Valuation Methodology Report, 58 Fed. Reg. 4601,
4602-03 (1993) (noting that contingent valuation is the only accepted economic method of
measuring nonuse values); see also Brian R. Binger et al., The Use of Contingent Valuation
Methodology in Natural Resource Damage Assessments: Legal Fact and Economic Fiction,
89 Nw. U. L. REv. 1029, 1031-32 (1995) (defining contingent valuation). Unfortunately, the
academic literature makes clear that contingent valuation is extremely variable and its
predictions of dubious accuracy. See Stewart, suira at 234-38; Binger, supra at 1069-70
(noting a host of biases inherent in contingent valuation methodologies); Daniel S. Levy &
David Friedman, The Revenge of the Redwoods? Reconsidering Property Rights and the
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be reduced to objective valuations.124 For these reasons, evaluating harms from
rule violations must engage some mechanism for effective public input. 125
Thus, courts have neither the institutional competence nor the democratic
pedigree to evaluate whether the threatened penalty for a rule violation
measures the expected harm from such a violation.
These countervailing concerns about ad hoc judicial determinations of the
timing of review suggests that Congress may be in a better position to preclude
pre-enforcement challenges to rules under particular statutory provisions. 126
Economic Allocation of Natural Resources, 61 U. Cm. L. REv. 493, 495-96 (1994)
(contingent valuation results vary by as much as 2000% and depend on whether the public
surveyed perceives itself as having a right to the interest harmed).
124See ROBERT NozicK, Tm NATURE OF RATIONAUTY 26-35 (1993) (arguing that
rational decisionmaking must incorporate the symbolic utility of actions); Richard H. Pildes &
Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 66 (1995)
(advocating a change in cost-benefit methodology to include "expressive dimensions of legal
and political choices"). Such symbolic or expressive interests would even include an interest
in reinforcing the "rule of law," which has traditionally guided our regulatory system. See
Keith Werhan, Delegalizing Administrative Law, 1996 U. IL. L. REv. 423, 466 (criticizing
the movement to delegalize administrative decisionmaking for jeopardizing "the fundamental
American commitment to the rule of law").
125 See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 124, at 62-63 (noting that differences between
experts and lay persons in assessing risks often reflect "clashes of value frameworks" and that
such clashes cannot be resolved without involvement of the public in decisionmaking
deliberations); Levy & Friedman, supra note 123, at 526 (concluding that contingent
valuation depends on "the need to define property rights in legal dispute[s], [which] may
necessitate a political solution").
12 6 It is not at all clear that Congress is interested in "deossifying" rulemaking. If
anything, the 104th Congress has indicated a distaste for regulation and has threatened to
increase the burden on the rulemaking process as a means of discouraging regulation. See
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Legislative Reform of Judicial Review of Agency Actions, 44 DUKE
L.J. 1110, 1127-28 (1995) (arguing that legislative action decreasing the influence of judicial
review currently is unlikely); Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the
Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REv. 247, 250 (1996) (asserting that many provisions passed
by the 104th Congress "represented an effort to clog the administrative process with
paperwork"). A majority of both houses supported bills that would have required agencies to
conduct cost-benefit analyses and risk assessments for all major rules. See, e.g., 141 CONG.
REc. H2372 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1995) (reporting House passage of H.R. 1022); 141 CONG.
REc. D888 (daily ed. July 20, 1995) (reporting failure of Senate to achieve 60 votes needed
for cloture on the Dole Amendment to the Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Bill, S.343).
This Article, however, limits itself to considering the extent and means of implementing
delayed review that will, in theory, maximize social welfare. Pragmatic considerations, such
as Congress's reluctance to ease regulatory burdens, might suggest that a case-by-case
imposition of barriers to pre-enforcement review may be the best that can be achieved in the
current political climate.
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Certain statutory provisions call for agencies to make rules that, if later
overturned, would strand enormous amounts of investment. For some of these
rules, delays in compliance also may not impose significant costs on the
statutory beneficiaries and implementation might not reveal information that
bears on the rules' validity. It is more important that such rules be optimal than
that they be adopted quickly. The availability of pre-enforcement review of
such rules would likely be socially beneficial.
An example would be a statute requiring the agency to establish a health-
based safety standard, such as a National Ambient Air Quality Standard
(NAAQS) under the Clean Air Act. 127 If a NAAQS were set too stringently,
and industry could not challenge a rule without being subject to the risk of a
substantial penalty, industry might be forced to invest an enormous amount of
money in emissions-control technology that provided little social benefit.
Moreover, the process of implementing and enforcing a NAAQS, requiring
each state to promulgate and enforce a comprehensive State Implementation
Plan, is so cumbersome and expensive that once the EPA establishes a NAAQS
it is loathe to change it.12 8 Thus, the administrative costs alone that would result
from judicial reversal of the NAAQS after the standard had been applied would
be great. Finally, the process of implementing and enforcing a NAAQS is not
likely to reveal additional information about the actual health benefits of the
standard, as such benefits may not show up for a long time after the NAAQS is
attained and would be confounded by the impact of other changes in the
environment of an area over this long period of time. Hence, retention of pre-
enforcement review of the NAAQS makes sense.
In contrast, when a statute specifies that a standard be based on cost or
feasibility, delaying review might be preferable. As already noted, the OSH
Act's requirement that OSHA set standards for toxic materials at a level which
protects workers' health to the extent feasible is an example of such a statute. 129
If entities faced penalties approximately equal to reasonable compliance costs,
then restricting review of an OSHA standard to the post-enforcement stage
would give industry an incentive to attempt to comply in good faith. The results
of such attempts would provide invaluable information about whether the
standard was economically or technologically infeasible. In addition, even if a
reviewing court later reversed an OSHA standard on the grounds it was
infeasible, efforts to meet the standard would not result entirely in wasted
127 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1994) (mandating that the EPA promulgate primary
NAAQS to protect the public health).
128 C. Mashaw, supra note 8, at 236 (recognizing that the complexity of the process of
implementing NAAQS "may demand legal certainty in order to mobilize political resources,
whatever the costs in legal adversariness").129 See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
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investment. Assuming that the statute is correct in its presumption that imposing
the most stringent standard affordable will benefit workers health, at least to
some extent, 130 then forcing industry closer to meeting the standard will
provide such a benefit. Thus, delaying review of such a standard is likely to
provide the benefits that Mashaw identified.
The key point of these examples is that Congress could provide for post-
enforcement review regulations under appropriate statutory provisions.
Theoretically, we need not rely on case-by-case judicial determinations about
the timing of review. In the appropriate regulatory context, adoption of
particular statutory provisions governing the timing of review appear to be the
preferable means for relieving the regulatory grid-lock that plagues agency
rulemaking.
V. CONCLUSION
Scholars of the administrative rulemaking process have bemoaned the
ossification of that process, in large measure blaming such ossification on
unreasonable demands that reviewing courts have imposed on agencies when
promulgating rules. One suggestion for relieving ossification is to delay the
availability of judicial review of a rule until the proceeding in which the agency
enforces the rule against a violator. Proponents of this suggestion reason that
delaying judicial review will discourage rule challenges, which will relieve
agencies of some of the burden they face in persuading courts of the validity of
their rules. Furthermore, they argue that even when a rule is challenged in an
enforcement proceeding, courts will have access to better information about the
rule's validity.
This Article has evaluated the net benefits of delaying judicial review by
investigating the likely impact of such a delay on compliance with rules by
regulated entities, review of rules by the judiciary, and the promulgation of
rules by agencies. Using a game theoretic analysis, the Article concludes that
any benefits of delaying the availability of judicial review to challenge an
agency rule depend greatly on the magnitude of the penalty that regulated
entities face for violating the rule. If the penalty is much less than the costs of
complying with the rule, entities are unlikely to attempt to comply. Without
such attempts at compliance, a reviewing court is unlikely to have better
information about the validity of the rule at the time the rule is enforced than
the court would have at the time the rule is adopted. If the penalty is much
130 This presumption is buttressed by the Supreme Court's reading the OSH Act to
require that OSHA first determine that the toxic substance at issue threatens workers' health at
the concentrations prohibited by the standard. See Industrial Union Dep't., AFL-CIO v.
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 643 n.48 (1980).
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greater than the compliance costs, delaying review is likely to induce universal
compliance with the rule, even if the rule is of suspect wisdom or legality. The
Article also reasons that the impact of delaying rule challenges on the care
agencies take in promulgating rules is highly unpredictable. Given that delaying
review increases the risk faced by regulated entities, the Article therefore
concludes that delaying the availability of rule challenges is not likely to provide
net social benefits except in a narrow set of regulatory circumstances.
Even within this narrow set of circumstances, the Article concludes that
courts should not dismiss rule challenges prior to enforcement as unripe for
judicial review. Ad hoc determinations of the ripeness of rule challenges create
legal uncertainty, and the determination of when social welfare is enhanced by
deeming a rule challenge premature is beyond the institutional competence and
legitimate authority of the courts. Rather, the Article suggests that Congress is
best suited to evaluate when the benefits of delaying the availability of a rule
challenge exceeds the costs of doing so. If Congress finds that a prohibition on
pre-enforcement review is warranted for rules adopted under a statutory
provision, it should restrict review to the enforcement stage as part of that
particular statutory provision.
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APPENDIX
ANALYSIS OF SIGNALING WHEN THIE COURT IMPOSES NO
PENALTY IN CASE OF UNIVERSAL VIOLATION AND ENTITIES CAN
COORDINATE THEIR COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOR.
If a reviewing court will necessarily not impose a penalty for a rule
violation when every entity fails to comply with the rule then the game is that
for signaling with q2 =0. That the entities can coordinate their compliance
behavior makes the game sequential: the second entity acts knowing the choice
of the first entity. Without loss of generality, one can assume that the first entity
to act is G.M. The extensive form for the game then is as follows:
G.M.
complies violates
CHRYSLER
complies violates complies violates
(-X, -X) (-X, -[X+P]) (-[X+P]I,-X) (-L,-L)
Because Chrysler knows, when it acts, whether G.M. has decided to
comply with or violate the rule, Chrysler can tailor its strategy to G.M.'s
behavior. If G.M. has complied, Chrysler will maximize its payoff at -X by
also complying; if G.M. has violated the rule, then Chrysler will maximize its
payoff at -L by also violating it. Knowing that Chrysler will so act, G.M. faces
the following simplified game:
G.M. A
complies violates
(-X, -X)
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G.M. therefore will violate the rule to maximize its payoff at -L. Because
G.M. violates the rule, so does Chrysler. The outcome is determined with
certainty: both entities will violate the rule.

